Marx - World History and World Freedom

For Marx, 'world history' is a tale of domination and oppression.  From the slaves of Ancient Greece to the feudal serfs of the Middle Ages and now the proletariat of capitalist enterprise, society has been defined by class antagonisms between ruler and ruled, always grounded in the material and economic relations of society. In what follows, I examine Marx’s description of capitalism unfolding within 'world history', its role in human alienation, and the possibility that we are being driven towards an epoch of change and emancipation. By taking into account historical and contemporary events since Marx, I conclude that although his thought is hard to refute, the pathway to freedom should be through gradualism - not revolution - because humans are not yet mature enough to partake in communist society as he intended it.

Unlike Hegel, who believed the external world was defined and improved through the objectification of human thought and reason, Marx considered the inversion to be true. In his view, the external (material) world defines the thought of humans rather than the other way round (Marx, 1973, p.102). The sources of human alienation - immaterial spiritual afflictions - can, and should, be traced back to material conditions in the world. As they come about, so do new forms of oppression and with them political conditions to match the situation. What distinguishes the capitalist mode of production in history is that is has simplified class antagonisms, and created a world market which it can exploit (Marx, 1998, p.56).

There are only two classes in capitalism: the bourgeoisie, capitalist owners of the means of production; and the proletariat, wage-labour workers. Ramping up with the Industrial Revolution, capitalism has worked to push all other historical and borderline classes down to the level of proletariat – both to minimise competition for power, and to maximise the profit and force of labour (Marx, 1998, p.56).

Capitalism gathers its profit through what Marx refers to as ‘surplus labour’. Whereas a product’s use-value should be equivalent to its labour-value (i.e. the labour invested in making a product), in the capitalist mode of production surplus-value (i.e. profit) is extracted through levers such as low wages, long hours, and high-intensity work (Fine/Saad-Filho, 2004, pp.39-44). These practices create maximum product for the minimum cost, with the result of increased profit for the capitalist. The Industrial Revolution has facilitated the capitalist exploitation of these levers by turning the worker into a commodity; labour has lost any specialisation and appeal it once had (Marx, 1998, p.58), and there is subsequently more competition for each position in the market. As the labour supply goes up, the labour demand and wages come down. As profit increases for the capitalist, quality of life decreases for the worker. However this does not mean exploitation is limited only to advanced industrial nations. On the contrary, capitalism is also, distinctively, a global economic phenomenon. In its insatiable appetite for profit, capitalism spreads its interests across the globe, searching for new markets, cheaper materials or labour, and by consequence creating a global economy (Marx, 1998, p.58). All countries must become part of the capitalist system, or face being excluded and left behind, says Marx (Marx, 1998, p.59). Capitalist exploitation becomes a global condition, with the consequence of the vast wretched majority being subjugated to the wealthy greedy minority. The only people left in society with autonomy and freedom are the capitalists, while everyone else is coerced against their true will and enslaved to the self-aggrandising capitalist enterprise. The workers are slaves to their status as workers, while the capitalists are free to perpetuate their mastery of human society.

It might be conceded that Marx’s era was, from a western domestic perspective, very different to ours. But that does not preclude his argument from having modern relevance. Working conditions in the industrial age were far worse than anything currently experienced in western societies today, but leaving aside the potentially damaging effects of stress in a modern working environment (a form of alienation in itself), at the global level of analysis we can still see the conditions Marx was describing perpetuated in the sweat-shops and child labour of developing nations. Here the oppressors are not capitalists within individual societies, but the capitalist nations and rich multinational corporations of the western world as a whole. Just as Marx described, they seek the cheapest raw materials and labour from across the globe to maximise profit. ‘Dependency theory’ (Kegley, 2009, p.142) even suggests that capitalism sustains these practices intentionally to maintain its standing in the global economic system – it needs the developing world to do unsavoury labour-intensive work so the West can maintain a comfortable life of cheap products and intellectual work opportunities (Marx, 1998, p.59). Think here of ex-colonial states that have accumulated world debt through emergency aid contributions and are then forced to pay this debt back by allowing a western monopoly on natural resource industries (e.g. oil, diamonds), or by selling their rich resources at vastly deflated prices. The result is ever-increasing capitalist influence upon profitable industries around the world.

Then, from an ideological perspective, another modern reality in accord with Marx’s description is the strongly encouraged (some may say enforced) spread of liberal democracy across the globe. Supporting his view that the advance of a ruling economic class is matched by its political advance (modern representative government for capitalism) (Marx, 1998, p.57), we see in most cases that where liberal democracy is embedded, so too are capitalist modes of exchange. Not only this, but as Marx proclaims; you either join the capitalist system or face being made extinct (Marx, 1998, p.59). The modern message is clear: implement liberal democratic reforms (in the name of ‘human rights’) or risk pressure via economic sanctions, invasion, or dissident support. It has come to the point where we are not even looking beyond liberal democracy for a form of political organisation to meet human needs, and liberal democracy has even been considered ‘The End of History’ (Fukuyama, 2006). Is this not a dogmatic and defeatist view to take? As Nietzsche would later point out, when we hold these ideals in such lofty regard, we are liable to become a subservient and weak race of people living nothing but a herd mentality (Nietzsche, 1997, #38).      

                There is however, in Marx’s view, an end to this domination in sight. Capitalism - internally unstable, and entailing the logic of its own demise - has unwittingly created the conditions to facilitate complete human emancipation (Ball, 1991, p.134).

Marx’s goal wasn't just alleviation from unpleasant work conditions (e.g. dirty factories, long working days), he wanted to free humankind from the predicament of alienation arising in societies where labour is coerced by capitalism (Marx, 1993, p.144). Marx believed the human race is defined by, and gains freedom through, productive activity that goes beyond the bare requirements for survival (Marx, 1993, p.140). This activity should be expressive activity, a process of shaping one's world as one's world, but in capitalist society it is an unpleasant necessity undertaken to avoid destitution (Marx, 1993, p.139). As a commodity, workers provide repeatable service at minimum cost, and obtain wages rather than the products of their activity. Alienated from the output of their labour, the workers with which they compete for work, the society in which they live, and ultimately themselves through the loss of labour as a life-affirming endeavour, what capitalism restricts is not merely a worker’s ability to choose a vocation or labour activity, but their ability to be human (Adams, 1991, pp.250-251). It forces the worker into a condition of total alienation.

The issue here is that in constantly revolutionising the means of production and the markets of supply and demand, capitalism is over-exploiting its labour. As the gap between bourgeoisie and proletariat widens, the worker’s life is degraded to levels approaching rock bottom. Eventually capitalism will go too far, and the worker, reduced to a level of existence where even survival is no longer guaranteed, will challenge the system that ails it (Marx, 1998, p.66). But in this moment, not only has the capitalist created the spiritual character of a people who will revolt to escape alienated existence; it has concentrated this character in the majority of the global population (Marx, 1998, p.65). Freedom has now become a task of the majority, for the majority, and as unions rise, and strikes affect industry, the seeds of revolution are sown (Marx, 1998, p.63). Financial crises are realised as over-production, under-consumption, and ultimately greed, bring about economic depression in greater and severer frequency (Marx, 1998, pp.60-61). But there is no-one left to help the capitalists now, as they have pushed everyone they could down to the level of proletariat. When they can extract no more from the system, and the worker can take no more, capitalism has set the stage for its own inevitable downfall. Now it must make way for communism (Marx, 1998, p.66). Only by abolishing capital and class antagonisms can we achieve true human freedom, and a material problem requires a material solution. Marx wants us to take the philosophical thought of his time (derived from thinkers such as Hegel) and turn it into concrete action (Marx, 1993, p.119) - praxis as revolution.

There are many aspects of Marx's prophetic thought which seem undeniably true; globalisation, ideology, global exploitation, and the decrease in socio-economic stability. But is capitalism really on the brink of collapse? I think not. Whilst it is true that the seeds of radicalism are demonstrating themselves again today via the libertarian ‘Tea Party’ and anti-capitalist 'Occupy' protests, the fact is that recent cases of extreme risk taking and greed in the financial sector have not brought capitalism crashing to the ground. I believe where Marx went wrong was in loyally focussing on, and expecting, revolutionary change. Take, for example, the 20th century’s fateful communist experiments (Holmes, 2009, pp.17-46). By forcing revolutionary philosophical ideas onto a premature social consciousness, these ‘communists’ were doomed to be burdened by internal contradictions of the social will that would rumble the foundations of their ideological ground. The point is, what I think Marx intended for his communist society, and what contributed to his lack of defining it in any great detail, was that it should come about as the realisation of a universal consciousness of willing persons. He wanted the global consciousness of humanity to desire communist society in its majority – to collaborate altruistically and universally toward the goal of classless society using any structure appropriate for, and desired by, the people of that time (Leys & Panitch, 1998, pp.26-27). This faith in humankind is astonishing. More so, because Marx didn't seem to realise that humans are nowhere near ready for such sudden, forceful change, and probably never will be. This, I believe, is not possible without coercion of a people's spirit. Full metamorphosis might not be impossible or unlikely over time, but this overturning of values needs to be through gradualism, not revolution. Just look at how many socialist policies - from ‘Obamacare’ to the social democracies of Europe - have been, or are being successfully introduced into modern capitalist societies (Newman, 2005, pp.49-50). I'm not saying they are perfect, or even universally popular, but if we follow the thought of Kant (1991, pp. 41-53) and Hegel (1991, pp. 41-53), and assume for a moment that history is a narrative of progress, then it appears as though we are becoming more humanistic and egalitarian. To me this is more akin to the unfolding history of practical reason (Kant, 1991, pp. 41-53) than it is of Marx's revolutionary emancipation. Gradual change is accepted over time by even its staunchest critics when delivered piecemeal. Implemented gradually, the levelling out of economic conditions is not to the disinterest of any one individual, but it is to the benefit of humanity as a whole. It also safeguards us from replacing one unjust regime with another, so if Capitalism does fall like earlier epochs of exploitation we will be more prudent in determining its replacement. I confess this conservative approach may seem diametrically at odds with Marx’s radicalism, but I believe it could in fact be the best guarantee we have of communism becoming a reality.

In this essay I reviewed Marx’s theory of capitalism as a dehumanising, self-defeating historical process, and its relevance within the modern world. Through this analysis I determined that when viewed against the global layer of critique, the practices and conditions Marx describes are still fully in view today, and the capitalist machine does indeed appear to be a force of exploitation and alienation. While Marx’s communist solution may yet be proved legitimate, the method he proposes to get there is not. If the communist revolutions of the 20^th century did anything for the capitalists, it was to provide them with a resounding victory, and my conclusion is that revolution is not the way forward. I believe our only beacon of hope in the cause for universal human emancipation is the gradual implementation of socialist reforms over time, and that history is a story of progress and unfolding reason. One day we will look back at this age with regret, but hopefully with the knowledge that human problems can and will be solved with human solutions.

REFERENCES

·         Adams, W. “Aesthetics: Liberating the senses”, The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.246-274.

·         Ball, T. “History: Critique and irony”, The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.134.

·         Fine, B. & Saad-Filho, A. “Capital and exploitation” Marx's Capital, 2004, pp.39-44.

·         Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 2006.

·         Hegel ,G.W.F., “The realisation of Spirit in history” in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp.54-55.

·         Holmes, L. Communism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, pp.17-46.

·         Kant, I. “Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, Kant: Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 41-53.

·         Kegley, C.W. World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Cengage Learning, Belmont CA, 2009, pp.127, 142.

·         Leys, C. & Panitch, L. “The Political Legacy of the Manifesto”, The Socialist Register, Merlin Press UK/Humanities Press New Jersey, 1998, pp.26-27.

·         Marx, K. Capital, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books, 1973, p.102.

·         Marx, K. & Engels, F. The Communist Manifesto, University of Colorado, 1998, pp.54-75.

·         Marx, K. “Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction”, The Portable Karl Marx, Penguin Books, 1993, pp.115-124.

·         Marx, K. Economico-philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, The Portable Karl Marx, Penguin Books, 1993, pp.131-152.

·         Newman, M. Socialism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.49-50.

·         Nietzsche, F. Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. Polt, Hacket Publishing Company, 1997, #38.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

·         Adams, W. “Aesthetics: Liberating the senses”, The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.246-274.

·         Ball, T. “History: Critique and irony”, The Cambridge Companion to Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.124-142.

·         Fine, B. & Saad-Filho, A. “Capital and exploitation” Marx's Capital, 2004, pp.31-50.

·         Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man, Free Press, New York, 2006.

·         Fukuyama, F. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, pp. 47-65.

·         Hegel, G.W.F. “The Good and conscience” in his Philosophy of Right, trans. A. White, Focus Philosophical Library, 2002, §§ 129-140.

·         Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, Introductions to Ethicality and State sections, 2002, §§ 142-157 and 257-271.

·         Hegel ,G.W.F., “The realisation of Spirit in history” in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp.47-67, 93-97.

·         Holmes, L. Communism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009.

·         Kant, I. “Transition From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1993, pp. 49-63.

·         Kant, I. “Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, Kant: Political Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 41-53.

·         Kegley, C.W. World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Cengage Learning, Belmont CA, 2009, pp.127, 142.

·         Leys, C. & Panitch, L. “The Political Legacy of the Manifesto”, The Socialist Register, Merlin Press UK/Humanities Press New Jersey, 1998, pp.18-41.

·         Marx, K. Capital, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes, Penguin Books, 1973, p.102.

·         Marx, K. & Engels, F. The Communist Manifesto, University of Colorado, 1998, pp.54-75

·         Marx, K. “Contribution to the critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction”, The Portable Karl Marx, Penguin Books, 1993, pp.115-124.

·         Marx, K. Economico-philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, The Portable Karl Marx, Penguin Books, 1993, pp.131-152.

·         Newman, M. Socialism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2005.

·         Nietzsche, F. Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. Polt, Hacket Publishing Company, 1997, #38.

·         Singer, P.  Hegel: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 1983.

·         Singer, P.  Marx: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 1980.

Hegel's Sittlichkeit - A Critique of Kantian Moral Autonomy

Hegel believed Kant uncovered the truth about morality, and should be deservedly praised for his achievement. He felt that Kant's formula of ‘reason = autonomy = freedom = morality’ was a remarkable leap in human progress, but also that it was an incomplete and problematic project. For Hegel, Kant had only uncovered half of the puzzle, and his critique centres on demonstrating how the project is incomplete, before providing an answer to the problem. The criticisms revolve around the lack of content within Kant's formula, and a void into which Hegel wishes to place concrete guidance. But also, Hegel is concerned with the misappropriation of this formula - the worrying possibility that a subjective inclination might be mistaken for a universal rationality, the very definition of evil. In this essay I describe the relationship between each philosopher’s thought and critically examine their relevance in modern times. My conclusion is that while both visions hold merit, only a theory that can adapt to our changing world will satisfy longer term human interests.

Kant believed the human condition to be caught up in a dualism between the heteronomy of the natural determined (phenomenal) world, and the autonomy of the ideal (noumenal) free world (Kant, 1993, p.53). For human beings, the noumenal world is unknowable in itself, and our only gateway to it is via the facts of reason grounding experience. For the purposes of practical reason, Kant articulates the notion of the categorical imperative (CI), the idea that for an act to be moral it must be grounded in universal reason, and it must be chosen not by way of inclination (i.e. desire, personality, social custom), but by free, rational, autonomous choice. It is our duty to do so, and it is a matter of making any undertaken endeavour accord to that which at the same time could be made into a universal law (Kant, 1993, p49). Kant develops this idea further into a distinction between conscience and the good, the good being that which is necessary and universal, and conscience being that which is contingent and particular (Hegel, 2002, §137). That conscience is only a contingent manifestation of the good leads Kant to a deontic theory of morals, where to do what is right is to do our duty. Hegel does not think this is done so simply. What, he says, is our duty? What is the particular action to be derived from universal law? The CI is excellent in the way in which it is grounded - humans really are rational creatures - but it provides no guidance in the world in which we act, and can be taken to mean anything if it is not appropriated correctly (Hegel, 2002, §133-135). Further, it presupposes cultural notions that are not adequately critiqued, and that once removed strip the CI down into a mere formalism (Critchley, 2001, p.112). Concepts such as theft, for example, can be justified by the CI if we remove the presupposed rights of property. Without this supposition, says Hegel, there is nothing to steal - the very act of stealing is impossible because there is no such thing as possession (Hegel, 2002, §135). To Hegel there is a gap in Kant's theory between the universal and the particular, the good and conscience, and the filling of this gap is crucial if humans are to ever be moral consistently.

Hegel’s solution is Sittlichkeit, the ethical social life where universality (Kantian moral law) and particularity (the specific content of any truly moral action) are brought together as one (O’Hagan, 1987, p.153). No longer are we left to an abstract dualism; moral subjects on one hand legal on the other, where we can simply ignore our duty to be moral, and each particular course of action needs to be assessed for its accordance with universal moral law (O’Hagan, 1987, p.146). In Sittlichkeit our moral actions are determined by the bearing that society and its institutions impose on us. Like Kant, Hegel believes freedom equates to rationality, but unlike Kant who can only provide formulaic, content-less duty, Hegel believes that rationality exists within the framework of modern social institutions such as the family, civil society, and the state, and moreover, that we already partake in moral activity as a process of normal everyday living (Hegel, 2002, §156-157).

Closely tied to Hegel's philosophy of history, this thinking really relates to a history of the development of 'spirit', and to understand spirit is to understand how the Kantian gap is closed. Spirit is what grounds rational, autonomous, free, being. Spirit is humanity reflecting upon itself and recognising itself within the world (Hegel, 1975, pp.50-51). Whether it is the phenomenon of another human being, or an invention of science, spirit is the non-physical recognising its ability to interact with, and indeed, change or impose itself upon the world. Everywhere you look, spirit is manifest, the very fact you can look implies spirit, because spirit is what connects us to the world. When this is understood, it follows logically that if spirit is within all human beings, then when that spirit is also impressed upon the world, what is in the world accords directly with what is in the human being. A correspondence between the outer objective world and subjective human inner being is developed, and because they are both parts of a larger entity - spirit - they integrate in perfect harmony. We already know from Kant that rational being is autonomous free will, so if spirit is rational being, then when the world corresponds, the world is rational, and by consequence it is autonomy and freedom reflected objectively (Hegel, 1975, pp.64,66). For Hegel, this reflection occurs through social institutions. When we are members of a family, or civil society, or even a state, we are living within the boundary of freedom realised in the world. They are spirit manifest through concrete social institutions, the same spirit that is contained within our being. Therefore to be a part of this society is to be concretely grounded in freedom. This is Sittlichkeit. Hegel has bridged the gap (of duty and of form/content) by defining particular actions taken within rational social institutions as an expression, or reflection, of universal moral law (Hegel, 1975, p.93).

Whilst both visions have merits, both are also flawed. We live in a time that has seen communism (mostly) defeated to capitalism, and can look back to lament a century producing some of the most self-destructive moments in human history. Only within this context can we appropriately assess the merit of each philosopher's vision in today's world. How are we to reconcile this history with the theories of Kant and Hegel?

On the economic front it is interesting to note that both philosophers could be seen as advocating socialist regimes of some sort. If we take Kant's notion of the CI as universality, then we should surely assume socialism as the preferred socio-economic structure for the world. Capitalism relies on hierarchy and inequalities to maintain itself, and can therefore never be universal. Similarly with Hegel, there is a common-mindedness called for in society through the objectification of rationality (Pippin in Deranty, 2011, p.4), and social conditions in which the greater good of the state trumps an individual’s worth (Hegel, 1975, p.95). Fukuyama (1992, p202) interprets this homogenisation of the state as a victory for liberal democracy, but Hegel's assertion that individuals may be sacrificed for the state (Hegel, 1975, p.95) does not strongly correspond. Surely this is more akin to socialist or communist states in history? On a global scale I also might argue that the economic hierarchy produced by capitalism is a form of the slave/master relationship Hegel feels is unsustainable given the human need for mutual recognition (Singer, 1983, pp.79-82). As long as the rich global north exploits the poor global south for cheap labour and produce, a relationship of universal recognition remains unrealised. Hegel admittedly does not seem too concerned about what other states are doing however. Unlike Kant (1991), whose vision is of an international cosmopolitan order, Hegel thinks states will always make enemies of one another and will always go to war. It is even a requirement of recognition (through negation) in his vision of the world (O’Hagan, 1987, p156). But within that state, does his system really allow for the individuality that capitalism champions? I think not. Even self contained capitalism would develop as a hierarchical social arrangement where the rich are masters and the poor are slaves. Indeed, the influence of Marx in promoting such ideas needs no further elaboration. Could we see a return to socialist ideologies? Well I think it is telling that today socialist ideas are being progressively integrated into even the most individualistic of nations. Take the recent US healthcare plan, or English welfare system. That the term 'welfare state' is used pejoratively by many English and US citizens means we must question if this social arrangement is truly in conformity with universal will, but either way these policies are concretised through law. More importantly as well, this slow introduction of socialist institutions into modern capitalist states evokes exactly the process Kant describes in his progressive teleological vision of freedom (Kant, 1991, p.52).

From another perspective, if we are to assess each philosopher against the backdrop of 20th century Nazism, fascism, and dictatorship, it appears neither can escape without criticism. It is in fact part of Hegel's Kantian critique that a subjective and content-less view of autonomy may be prone to misappropriation. What Hegel fears and describes as the actuality of evil, is that a subjective view of the world that is not a true representation of freedom may be imposed objectively upon the world under the false epithet of rationality (Hegel, 2002, §139-140). We need only look at the rise of Hitler and the Nazis to see how this vision became tragically true. Hitler's distorted view of the world was objectified in Nazi Germany, and forced upon many other occupied states. However, it is perhaps within Hegel's own doctrine of the strong state (Hegel, 2002, §261, §272) that we can see a seminal idea of totalitarianism justified. Is this a fair charge against Hegel?

It is in fact related to the point that I believe is Sittlichkeit’s undoing. What Hegel gains by turning Kant's abstract into concrete, he loses by postulating too much. Formalism is indeed a problem that needs attention, but by identifying the specific institutions conducive to freedom, Hegel takes the added step of telling us they must be locked in and venerated (Hegel, 2002, §261, §272). This process combined with evil (irrational subjectivity objectified) is what led to the totalitarianism and atrocities these regimes embarked upon. The problem in my view is that when it comes to human endeavour and matters of how we should live, there are no absolutes. We cannot assume things are right absolutely, even if they appear perfect, because as new historical moments emerge, new lessons are learnt, and new perspectives are born. What we need is a guide that can heuristically beacon the correct course of action. One in which the content is not given absolutely, because content (and the historical moments contextualising it) will change from one time to another. The requirement is for a solution like the CI that in its abstractness can work with changing historical circumstances - something like Rawls’ Political Liberalism perhaps, which looks for overlapping consensus amongst a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines (e.g. philosophies, religions)(Rawls, 1993, pp.13-14). This should not detract from the usefulness of Hegel's vision - his mission to create a system that will define concrete freedom is useful and can provide real guidance - but it must be considered an open project we should all continuously seek to refine, perhaps one day to realise perfectly. And this is exactly the point of Kant's teleology, and the reason why for now, it must still be considered the most appropriate ground for modern autonomy.

I have attempted to show both merits and flaws of Hegelian and Kantian moral autonomy. Kant's system presents a real problem in its lack of concrete substance, but Hegel's solution of freedom embedded within social institutions as the realisation of spirit cannot be considered a finished endeavour. The world is ever-changing, and the world is ever-progressing, therefore only an evolving solution can provide guidance to meet the challenge presented, and only Kant leaves a framework abstract enough to provide ever ongoing relevance. In the end these philosophers are more entwined that at first may be apparent, and it is subsequently the case that whether you are Kantian or Hegelian you will put faith in reason as the fabric of freedom and autonomy. You will also however reflect upon human history since the time of these great men with the knowledge that they would be horrified to see the tragedies they sought to avoid having been so devastatingly realised. Their legacy leaves us with the knowledge that the solution to freedom lies within us all - whether we can realise it or not will be told in a history of the future.

REFERENCES

·         Critchley, S. A Very Short Introduction to Continental Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.112.

·         Deranty, J. “Rationality, Autonomy, and the Social Bond”, Philosophy Today, Vol. 55, No.1 (April 2011), pp.3-10.

·         Fukuyama, F. “The Universal and Homogeneous State,” The End of History and the Last Man, 1992, pp. 199-210.

·         Hegel, G.W.F. “The Good and conscience” in his Philosophy of Right, trans. A. White, Focus Philosophical Library, 2002, §§ 129-140.

·         Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, Introductions to Ethicality and State sections, 2002, §§ 142-157 and 257-271.

·         Hegel ,G.W.F., “The realisation of Spirit in history” in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp.47-67, 93-97.

·         Kant, I. “Transition From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1993, pp. 49-63.

·         Kant, I. “Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Political Writings, 1991, pp. 41-53.

·         O’Hagan, “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 1987, pp.135-160.

·         Singer, P.  A Very Short Introduction to Hegel, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.79-82.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

·         Critchley, S. A Very Short Introduction to Continental Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2001.

·         Deranty, J. “Rationality, Autonomy, and the Social Bond”, Philosophy Today, Vol. 55, No.1 (April 2011), pp.3-10.

·         Fukuyama, F. “The Universal and Homogeneous State,” The End of History and the Last Man, 1992, pp. 199-210.

·         Fukuyama, F. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, pp. 47-65.

·         Habermas, J. “On the Internal Relation Between Rule of Law and Democracy,” The Inclusion of the Other, pp. 253-264.

·         Hegel, G.W.F. “The Good and conscience” in his Philosophy of Right, trans. A. White, Focus Philosophical Library, 2002, §§ 129-140.

·         Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, Introductions to Ethicality and State sections, 2002, §§ 142-157 and 257-271.

·         Hegel ,G.W.F., “The realisation of Spirit in history” in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp.47-67, 93-97.

·         Kant, I. “Transition From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1993, pp. 49-63.

·         Kant, I. “Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Political Writings, pp. 41-53.

·         Korsgaard, C. “Morality as Freedom,” Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 159-185.

·         O’Hagan, “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 1987, pp.135-160.

·         Rawls, J. The Law of Peoples §§1-2, pp.11-23.

·         Redding, P. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/hegel/>.

·         Singer, P.  A Very Short Introduction to Hegel, Oxford University Press, 1983.

·         Taylor, C. “Nature as Source,” Sources of the Self: The Making of the Self, pp. 356-367.

·         Westphal, K, “The basic context and structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” in Companion to Hegel, Ed. Frederick Beiser, Cambridge University Press, 1975.

The State of Nurture (my book proposal)

SUMMARY:

My proposal is for a political and philosophical fiction novel entitled ‘The State of Nurture’. At first appearance, the book is a children’s fable – a traditional western narrative articulating an underlying moral lesson. It is the story of a group of schoolchildren who are left unattended in class one day by accident. After some general misbehaviour, the group decides to draw up some rules based on what their teacher taught them. Disagreements ensue - and personality clashes soon escalate into trouble. Discovering they still have a lot to learn about right and wrong, some children take things too far, and in the end it’s only the intervening Head who can bring order and harmony.

The title itself is a pun on Thomas Hobbes’ concept of a ‘state of nature’. This is an underlying aspect of the book that becomes a densely symbolic allegory for the global anarchy characterising current international politics. Its application will demonstrate the way in which an international social contract might be our only way to avoid self-destruction.  With each child representing a politically prominent country in the world, the absent teacher representing an undefined concept of God, and the intervening Head representing new world order, this is an exploration of various nations’ idiosyncrasies, their attempts to find meaning - and the way in which we, the human race, can all relate. While this book will in many ways espouse a western placed perspective, utilising western philosophy, and perhaps even coming to western conclusions, its aim throughout will be to animate global actors as they are, without bias, and to be sympathetic to their constraints and contingencies (be they physical, historical or other).

STYLE:

This book is at once a work of general fiction and a political/philosophical treatise. Written in the style of George Orwell’s Animal Farm or Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, the book will have a dual level narrative. At the surface it will be written in the easy reading style of a children’s fable, with both humorous and heart-warming elements. It will follow a familiar narrative formula of harmony, disharmony, heroes, villains, and a happy ending. It will not include judgements of good or evil, only misguided actions, and these will all be given cause. Introducing the characters as they each take a prominent place in the course of events, the story will switch between the classroom and to past snapshots of the characters personal lives. It will explore their inner struggles, desires, and the way in which they have been affected by such things.

Beneath this exterior narrative there will be a deeper, serious, and ambiguous meaning intended for reader interpretation and analysis. What this means, is that the characters and events in the book will be symbolic in a way that is never explicit or definite. Meaning needs to be produced by the reader, and may be produced in different forms. For example, the absent teacher would never explicitly be defined as its symbolic counterpart (God). Allowing for an open interpretation here will work more effectively due to the varying perspectives people hold about such personal concepts. Readers will be able to dismiss elements of this feature that do not fit with their own model of the term, and to accept any elements that do. In this way the allusions in this book should rarely appear incongruent to reader opinion.

FORM/STRUCTURE:

The main classroom narrative will be from the perspective of an omniscient narrator in an almost entirely linear time format. The opening chapter will set the scene, by depicting the culmination of the morning’s events, before the narrative returns to the beginning of the day and works in a chronological sequence. Each chapter will be focussed on a character or group of characters, based on their level of involvement with the current class affairs. Interlaced within the narrative of each of these chapters, will be brief escapes and flashbacks explaining the characters backgrounds, private thoughts, and experiences. These will be in thematic form, each from a different narrative perspective, and delivered in various writing styles. Modern mediums of communication such as Facebook chat and Twitter will be used here, as well as traditional forms of production like personal diaries and playground dialogues. All chapters will open with a quotation summarising the political or philosophical themes dealt with by that section. This is to provide context for the narrative that follows.

PLOT/CHAPTERS:

The story opens with a culmination of the day’s events. Ehsan (Iran) has attacked David (Israel) after David tried to overpower him with force. Michael (USA) has intervened, but Ehsan, being part of a minority group in the class, is armed and dangerous.

At this point the story returns to the beginning of the day and describes in chronological order the events that lead up to this violent conflict.

Cliques representing Eastern and Western nations emerge from the outset, and the conflict between these is a recurrent theme throughout.

As the story unfolds, it recounts allusions to historical epochs; such as European colonialism (Ch5), the Cold War (Ch8), and 9/11 (Ch12).

Once the opening scene is re-encountered, the story moves forth into a new phase where events are based solely on a speculation of what the future could be. This is placed in a world of no global anarchy, where a new world order (the Head) leads to authoritative, legitimate international law (the class constitution) accepted by all.

1.   The End – Part 1

David lies bleeding on the floor as Ehsan threatens to cause Michael serious harm too

2.   The Prefect

The prefect passes by to tell the children their Teacher won’t be in today. The Head is also supposed to be notified so that a substitute can be organised, but when the prefect gets waylaid, so does the message...

3.   David

The Teacher’s favourite student David, reminds the class of how Teacher would expect them to behave.

4.   Cristian

Cristian thinks the rules need altering and sets to work on altering and enforcing the rules. Not everyone agrees

5.   Jack, Camille, and Lucia

Jack, Camille and Lucia use questionable tactics to recruit members for their gangs

6.   Max

Max wants control and group fighting soon breaks out – the outcome is a brawl to end them all. 

7.   Michael

Michael uses his strength and popularity to stop the fighting, but makes significant enemies along the way.

8.   Ivan

When it seems that Ivan is popular too, a big rivalry emerges. But who will win the race to dominate the class?

9.   Tara and Imran

There isn’t much left of Jack’s gang, and when Tara and Imran fall out, it looks like he’s left looking up to Michael.

10.        Aya

Aya did bad things earlier in the day, and resolving never to be so bad again, finds a new way to gain influence in the class.

11.        Kian

Kian isn’t that popular, but he’s strong and he has things his classmates want. Can he tip the class balance in his favour? It’s starting to look that way.

12.        Muna, Ehsan, Omar

When Michael is attacked, Jack and a few others rally round to point the finger at a Muna, Ehsan, Omar and their friends.

13.        The End – Part 2

When Ehsan uses a bat to hit David, and Michael decides to intervene, Ehsan threatens to cause Michael serious damage. Jack, Aya, and Max sound the alarm and call for outside help.

14.        The New Head

The New Head arrives to calm everyone down. No-one has seen the New Head before and no-one knows what to expect. Everyone is scared and wonders what will happen to them.

15.        The Beginning

The New Head thinks the kids need a class constitution to determine their behaviour towards each other, and gets everyone working on it in a team. Enemies soon earn new respect for each and everyone starts having fun – could this be a new beginning for all?

LENGTH:
The book will be around 50000 words/160 pages in length.

RATIONALE: 
To my knowledge, there is no work that anthropomorphises the nation-state in a manner such as my proposal. What this approach allows, is for an exploration of how nation-state personalities develop, why they are often misinterpreted, and how they can be justified in the way they do things, even if outsiders may not understand or agree with their customs and behaviours. It is my hope that people who attempt to read this work may be able to humanise foreign nations, and realise that even ostensibly repugnant laws, customs, traditions etc… have some basis in inescapable and influential historical factors that, once experienced, are embedded stubbornly and difficult to shake. My intention is that this should reflect the way in which, as individuals, all humans have behaviours which may seem peculiar to others, and are manifestations of that person’s experiences and personal history. Nations are defined by their physical attributes, their people, and their history. This book aims to characterise these attributes in the form of individuals. This is all a stage for the book’s ultimate motive: to demonstrate (what I perceive to be) the absurdity of staunch nationalism. We are psychologically all very similar to start, yet our physical structure, interactions with others, and our experiences, all mould this similarity into something unique. Similarly, borders are mere human inventions, and we are divided from others only by custom, culture, and historical events.

Ultimately we all have the same needs/drives, and if we can overlook our historically contingent differences, then we may work together for a collective good with values shared by all. Hobbes’ theories deemed that we give up freedom to obtain liberty, and that we do this because it benefits us all. This may be a Western construct, but in seeking to explain relationships and personalities through historical events and inner psychological conflict, this book aims to provide an unbiased understanding of why each nation-state has their own sense of morality, and to show that we don’t have to sacrifice personality or culture to work together towards international liberty.

AUDIENCE:
I think this work will appeal to multiple audiences, and may in fact have the capacity to appeal in different ways at different times (or when read in different contexts). It is aimed at all readers of fiction, and at students (of all ages) with an interest in political/philosophical theory. The work is ultimately intended to be an entertaining read. I would hope that a casual reading, with no analysis, will still keep the reader engaged throughout. With this perspective in mind, the book is aimed at everyone from children to adults; regardless of creed, nationality, or allegiance. The deeper message is intended for inquisitive minds; those who wish to understand the international political system from an original vantage point, and who could use the work as a theoretical framework for assessing and predicting the behaviours of global actors in our world today.
I foresee two challenges in successfully achieving this wide appeal. Firstly, I must ensure the characters portrayed are not stereotyped, or based solely on extant characteristics. This will achieve no more than an obvious and clichéd perspective, resulting in dismissal by large groups of readers. Secondly, the deeper political message must be carefully balanced between being hidden and being interpretable. It should never be explicit as this will destroy the intended feel of the book. I want the initial impact of the book to be its explicit relationships and narrative, and the interpretation/analysis to come after. This is so readers can attach themselves to the characters prior to casting judgement, and before bias or preconceived opinions have had a chance to guide understanding. Hopefully this will situate some readers in an unexpected position – one they did not, and could not, envisage prior to reading the book.

EXCERPT:

The End – Part 2

"[If we are to avoid a nuclear war] a system of world order - preferably a system of world government - is mandatory ... The proud nations someday will see the light and, for the common good and their own survival, yield up their precious sovereignty."

Walter Cronkite: A Reporter's Life (1997)

Michael stared at the bat. David was crying, but still Michael didn’t dare move to help him. Ehsan fixed his stare. He was defiantly challenging either of them to move.

“Tough guy want it too? Always giving it the big ‘I am’ - come on then! You’re not going to boss me around Michael. I’m giving my brother back his chair whether you like it or not. I warned David, and I warned you.”

Michael’s brow was moist and he was worried. He was sure he could win this fight, but would Ehsan swing the bat first, and hit him in the process? He looked over Ehsan’s shoulder at the other children who had stopped dead and were staring. He searched for some indication of oncoming help, but everyone was stunned frozen. Ehsan felt enmity united within him. He hated Michael and his gang, but he knew he couldn’t beat them. The class looked on with disapproving glares and he felt a knot of guilt well up within. All the days’ threats and words had been in earnest, but part of him wished he could take it all back right now. It was Jack who first broke the silence.

“Ehsan, stop it.” He motioned to Camille and Max as if to infer they should be backing him up.

The distraction was enough. Michael grabbed the bat and threw his weight at Ehsan. The pair fell over with Michael smothering the smaller boy. As they wrestled each other’s arms, Michael was slapping, scratching, pulling and shouting.

“Think you’re a big boy cos you can grab a bat and make threats?”

Ehsan dropped the bat to free his hand. He grabbed an arm and bit hard into Michael’s finger, making him yelp. Jack ran over and kicked Ehsan in the side. Dropping to his knees he helped Michael restrain him. As David moved to help too, Michael rolled off and picked up the bat. He held it above his head with a maddened expression upon his face.

 “Stop it or I’ll smash you with this thing I swear!”

Ivan picked another bat off the shelf and held it up ready to swing.

“What if I smash you first? Why are you getting involved? It’s David’s problem. Same old story, you can’t help but interfere. Throwing your weight around. Let them sort out their own issues!”

His eyes dared Michael to answer. Surprised, Michael turned to face Ivan, the bat now poised in his direction. Jack and David continued to restrain Ehsan.

                “Here we are again. So we’ll settle our issues instead then? Once and for all?”

Max was close to tears. He thought they’d moved on from all this, but now it was worse than ever. Shaking his head in disbelief he looked first at Camille, then Aya, Sophie and Lucia.

“I’m going to get someone. Someone’s gonna get really hurt.”

He moved to the door. Michael frowned but kept his eyes on Ivan.

“Where are you going, Max?”

“I’m going to get a teacher, I don’t care what you lot say, you’re all stupid and out of control. Enough is enough.”

                “Max don’t you dare!”

                Aya had a look of disappointed despair.

“He’s right. You haven’t learnt anything. Every time the fighting kicks off you say that’ll be the last of it. Me and Max kept to our word, so why not you guys? Come on Max.”

Max pulled open the door open and hurried through with a few others. Michael desperately wanted to stop them, but daren’t move in case Ivan attacked. He couldn’t even risk turning his eyes away.

There was silence for what seemed like an eternity, until suddenly, in the distance, they heard the heels of an adults shoes coming down the corridor.

Clip, clop. Clip, clop.

Both their eyes widened in panic.

Clip, clop. Clip, clop.

Jack looked down at Ehsan.

“Gonna behave if I let you go?”

Ehsan nodded hurriedly, knowing he was in the worst trouble. 

Clip, clop. Clip, clop.

As Jack released Ehsan and ran toward his desk, he reflected on a feeling of pride and shame. He’d been leader of class today, and fought like a hero. But like Michael, he’d thought too highly of himself. He’d thought he was better than everyone, but in reality was just a bully when he needed to be. Helping others only when it was in his interest. Now he was just Michael’s bruised sidekick. Maybe it was a good thing the class would go back to normal. He could be himself again, he thought.

Clip, clop. Clip, clop.

Ehsan picked himself up and scrambled back to his chair. He knew the others would blame it all on him, but he didn’t care right now. Michael and the others couldn’t hurt him once a teacher was there. He wondered whether he could tell the teacher about how they took his brother’s chair, but sighed as he realised the teacher wouldn’t care.

Clip, clop. Clip, clop.

Michael and Ivan quickly threw their bats to the corner. They held their stare for a moment and both knew it was over. There was no more hate. Maybe there never really had been. Fear, jealousy, and a difference of opinions was all. Their gangs were finished and so was their rivalry. Would they have ever really used the bats? Ivan smirked at the thought.

Clip, clop.

Michael and Ivan turned towards their desks.

Clop.

Everyone stopped as a strange brooding figure stood in the doorway, Max and the others either side. No one had seen the new Head before, and no-one knew what to expect. Every child was frozen and transfixed. Each felt apprehension, but with it, complete and willing submission. Relief washed over them as they lamented a loss of liberty and welcomed a promise of order and safety. The classroom was no longer theirs, but perhaps it never had been. No-one had had real control. Not until now.