Hegel's Sittlichkeit - A Critique of Kantian Moral Autonomy

Hegel believed Kant uncovered the truth about morality, and should be deservedly praised for his achievement. He felt that Kant's formula of ‘reason = autonomy = freedom = morality’ was a remarkable leap in human progress, but also that it was an incomplete and problematic project. For Hegel, Kant had only uncovered half of the puzzle, and his critique centres on demonstrating how the project is incomplete, before providing an answer to the problem. The criticisms revolve around the lack of content within Kant's formula, and a void into which Hegel wishes to place concrete guidance. But also, Hegel is concerned with the misappropriation of this formula - the worrying possibility that a subjective inclination might be mistaken for a universal rationality, the very definition of evil. In this essay I describe the relationship between each philosopher’s thought and critically examine their relevance in modern times. My conclusion is that while both visions hold merit, only a theory that can adapt to our changing world will satisfy longer term human interests.

Kant believed the human condition to be caught up in a dualism between the heteronomy of the natural determined (phenomenal) world, and the autonomy of the ideal (noumenal) free world (Kant, 1993, p.53). For human beings, the noumenal world is unknowable in itself, and our only gateway to it is via the facts of reason grounding experience. For the purposes of practical reason, Kant articulates the notion of the categorical imperative (CI), the idea that for an act to be moral it must be grounded in universal reason, and it must be chosen not by way of inclination (i.e. desire, personality, social custom), but by free, rational, autonomous choice. It is our duty to do so, and it is a matter of making any undertaken endeavour accord to that which at the same time could be made into a universal law (Kant, 1993, p49). Kant develops this idea further into a distinction between conscience and the good, the good being that which is necessary and universal, and conscience being that which is contingent and particular (Hegel, 2002, §137). That conscience is only a contingent manifestation of the good leads Kant to a deontic theory of morals, where to do what is right is to do our duty. Hegel does not think this is done so simply. What, he says, is our duty? What is the particular action to be derived from universal law? The CI is excellent in the way in which it is grounded - humans really are rational creatures - but it provides no guidance in the world in which we act, and can be taken to mean anything if it is not appropriated correctly (Hegel, 2002, §133-135). Further, it presupposes cultural notions that are not adequately critiqued, and that once removed strip the CI down into a mere formalism (Critchley, 2001, p.112). Concepts such as theft, for example, can be justified by the CI if we remove the presupposed rights of property. Without this supposition, says Hegel, there is nothing to steal - the very act of stealing is impossible because there is no such thing as possession (Hegel, 2002, §135). To Hegel there is a gap in Kant's theory between the universal and the particular, the good and conscience, and the filling of this gap is crucial if humans are to ever be moral consistently.

Hegel’s solution is Sittlichkeit, the ethical social life where universality (Kantian moral law) and particularity (the specific content of any truly moral action) are brought together as one (O’Hagan, 1987, p.153). No longer are we left to an abstract dualism; moral subjects on one hand legal on the other, where we can simply ignore our duty to be moral, and each particular course of action needs to be assessed for its accordance with universal moral law (O’Hagan, 1987, p.146). In Sittlichkeit our moral actions are determined by the bearing that society and its institutions impose on us. Like Kant, Hegel believes freedom equates to rationality, but unlike Kant who can only provide formulaic, content-less duty, Hegel believes that rationality exists within the framework of modern social institutions such as the family, civil society, and the state, and moreover, that we already partake in moral activity as a process of normal everyday living (Hegel, 2002, §156-157).

Closely tied to Hegel's philosophy of history, this thinking really relates to a history of the development of 'spirit', and to understand spirit is to understand how the Kantian gap is closed. Spirit is what grounds rational, autonomous, free, being. Spirit is humanity reflecting upon itself and recognising itself within the world (Hegel, 1975, pp.50-51). Whether it is the phenomenon of another human being, or an invention of science, spirit is the non-physical recognising its ability to interact with, and indeed, change or impose itself upon the world. Everywhere you look, spirit is manifest, the very fact you can look implies spirit, because spirit is what connects us to the world. When this is understood, it follows logically that if spirit is within all human beings, then when that spirit is also impressed upon the world, what is in the world accords directly with what is in the human being. A correspondence between the outer objective world and subjective human inner being is developed, and because they are both parts of a larger entity - spirit - they integrate in perfect harmony. We already know from Kant that rational being is autonomous free will, so if spirit is rational being, then when the world corresponds, the world is rational, and by consequence it is autonomy and freedom reflected objectively (Hegel, 1975, pp.64,66). For Hegel, this reflection occurs through social institutions. When we are members of a family, or civil society, or even a state, we are living within the boundary of freedom realised in the world. They are spirit manifest through concrete social institutions, the same spirit that is contained within our being. Therefore to be a part of this society is to be concretely grounded in freedom. This is Sittlichkeit. Hegel has bridged the gap (of duty and of form/content) by defining particular actions taken within rational social institutions as an expression, or reflection, of universal moral law (Hegel, 1975, p.93).

Whilst both visions have merits, both are also flawed. We live in a time that has seen communism (mostly) defeated to capitalism, and can look back to lament a century producing some of the most self-destructive moments in human history. Only within this context can we appropriately assess the merit of each philosopher's vision in today's world. How are we to reconcile this history with the theories of Kant and Hegel?

On the economic front it is interesting to note that both philosophers could be seen as advocating socialist regimes of some sort. If we take Kant's notion of the CI as universality, then we should surely assume socialism as the preferred socio-economic structure for the world. Capitalism relies on hierarchy and inequalities to maintain itself, and can therefore never be universal. Similarly with Hegel, there is a common-mindedness called for in society through the objectification of rationality (Pippin in Deranty, 2011, p.4), and social conditions in which the greater good of the state trumps an individual’s worth (Hegel, 1975, p.95). Fukuyama (1992, p202) interprets this homogenisation of the state as a victory for liberal democracy, but Hegel's assertion that individuals may be sacrificed for the state (Hegel, 1975, p.95) does not strongly correspond. Surely this is more akin to socialist or communist states in history? On a global scale I also might argue that the economic hierarchy produced by capitalism is a form of the slave/master relationship Hegel feels is unsustainable given the human need for mutual recognition (Singer, 1983, pp.79-82). As long as the rich global north exploits the poor global south for cheap labour and produce, a relationship of universal recognition remains unrealised. Hegel admittedly does not seem too concerned about what other states are doing however. Unlike Kant (1991), whose vision is of an international cosmopolitan order, Hegel thinks states will always make enemies of one another and will always go to war. It is even a requirement of recognition (through negation) in his vision of the world (O’Hagan, 1987, p156). But within that state, does his system really allow for the individuality that capitalism champions? I think not. Even self contained capitalism would develop as a hierarchical social arrangement where the rich are masters and the poor are slaves. Indeed, the influence of Marx in promoting such ideas needs no further elaboration. Could we see a return to socialist ideologies? Well I think it is telling that today socialist ideas are being progressively integrated into even the most individualistic of nations. Take the recent US healthcare plan, or English welfare system. That the term 'welfare state' is used pejoratively by many English and US citizens means we must question if this social arrangement is truly in conformity with universal will, but either way these policies are concretised through law. More importantly as well, this slow introduction of socialist institutions into modern capitalist states evokes exactly the process Kant describes in his progressive teleological vision of freedom (Kant, 1991, p.52).

From another perspective, if we are to assess each philosopher against the backdrop of 20th century Nazism, fascism, and dictatorship, it appears neither can escape without criticism. It is in fact part of Hegel's Kantian critique that a subjective and content-less view of autonomy may be prone to misappropriation. What Hegel fears and describes as the actuality of evil, is that a subjective view of the world that is not a true representation of freedom may be imposed objectively upon the world under the false epithet of rationality (Hegel, 2002, §139-140). We need only look at the rise of Hitler and the Nazis to see how this vision became tragically true. Hitler's distorted view of the world was objectified in Nazi Germany, and forced upon many other occupied states. However, it is perhaps within Hegel's own doctrine of the strong state (Hegel, 2002, §261, §272) that we can see a seminal idea of totalitarianism justified. Is this a fair charge against Hegel?

It is in fact related to the point that I believe is Sittlichkeit’s undoing. What Hegel gains by turning Kant's abstract into concrete, he loses by postulating too much. Formalism is indeed a problem that needs attention, but by identifying the specific institutions conducive to freedom, Hegel takes the added step of telling us they must be locked in and venerated (Hegel, 2002, §261, §272). This process combined with evil (irrational subjectivity objectified) is what led to the totalitarianism and atrocities these regimes embarked upon. The problem in my view is that when it comes to human endeavour and matters of how we should live, there are no absolutes. We cannot assume things are right absolutely, even if they appear perfect, because as new historical moments emerge, new lessons are learnt, and new perspectives are born. What we need is a guide that can heuristically beacon the correct course of action. One in which the content is not given absolutely, because content (and the historical moments contextualising it) will change from one time to another. The requirement is for a solution like the CI that in its abstractness can work with changing historical circumstances - something like Rawls’ Political Liberalism perhaps, which looks for overlapping consensus amongst a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines (e.g. philosophies, religions)(Rawls, 1993, pp.13-14). This should not detract from the usefulness of Hegel's vision - his mission to create a system that will define concrete freedom is useful and can provide real guidance - but it must be considered an open project we should all continuously seek to refine, perhaps one day to realise perfectly. And this is exactly the point of Kant's teleology, and the reason why for now, it must still be considered the most appropriate ground for modern autonomy.

I have attempted to show both merits and flaws of Hegelian and Kantian moral autonomy. Kant's system presents a real problem in its lack of concrete substance, but Hegel's solution of freedom embedded within social institutions as the realisation of spirit cannot be considered a finished endeavour. The world is ever-changing, and the world is ever-progressing, therefore only an evolving solution can provide guidance to meet the challenge presented, and only Kant leaves a framework abstract enough to provide ever ongoing relevance. In the end these philosophers are more entwined that at first may be apparent, and it is subsequently the case that whether you are Kantian or Hegelian you will put faith in reason as the fabric of freedom and autonomy. You will also however reflect upon human history since the time of these great men with the knowledge that they would be horrified to see the tragedies they sought to avoid having been so devastatingly realised. Their legacy leaves us with the knowledge that the solution to freedom lies within us all - whether we can realise it or not will be told in a history of the future.

REFERENCES

·         Critchley, S. A Very Short Introduction to Continental Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.112.

·         Deranty, J. “Rationality, Autonomy, and the Social Bond”, Philosophy Today, Vol. 55, No.1 (April 2011), pp.3-10.

·         Fukuyama, F. “The Universal and Homogeneous State,” The End of History and the Last Man, 1992, pp. 199-210.

·         Hegel, G.W.F. “The Good and conscience” in his Philosophy of Right, trans. A. White, Focus Philosophical Library, 2002, §§ 129-140.

·         Hegel, G.W.F., The Philosophy of Right, Introductions to Ethicality and State sections, 2002, §§ 142-157 and 257-271.

·         Hegel ,G.W.F., “The realisation of Spirit in history” in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp.47-67, 93-97.

·         Kant, I. “Transition From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1993, pp. 49-63.

·         Kant, I. “Idea for a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” Political Writings, 1991, pp. 41-53.

·         O’Hagan, “On Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 1987, pp.135-160.

·         Singer, P.  A Very Short Introduction to Hegel, Oxford University Press, 1983, pp.79-82.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

·         Critchley, S. A Very Short Introduction to Continental Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2001.

·         Deranty, J. “Rationality, Autonomy, and the Social Bond”, Philosophy Today, Vol. 55, No.1 (April 2011), pp.3-10.

·         Fukuyama, F. “The Universal and Homogeneous State,” The End of History and the Last Man, 1992, pp. 199-210.

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·         Kant, I. “Transition From a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1993, pp. 49-63.

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