Those who believe prenatal diagnosis [PD] and selective abortion [SA] discriminate against the disabled, commonly argue that non-disabled people misinterpret or misrepresent disabled life. Others, who think differently, argue PD and SA will be counterbalanced by other forces at work and do not directly affect the moral status of disabled persons.
Saxton (Saxton, 1988, p.218) argues that these practices are discriminatory to the disabled, and challenges the view she believes most people hold about disability such as:
i. Having a disabled child is undesirable
ii. Disability necessarily involves low quality of life
iii. The living are adequately placed to decide whether someone is better off never being born
She thinks these are symptoms of a society obsessed with physical attributes like beauty or athleticism, and lead to discrimination in everyday life (Saxton, 1988, p.218). Also, some of the cases intended to demonstrate the difficulties of parenting a disabled child are actually obscured by other contributing factors that would make raising even a non-disabled child difficult. It is not so much disability that is the issue, she says, but the prejudiced society in which disability is placed (Saxton, 1988, pp.220-221). Once impediments related to mobility or pain are alleviated disabled people often live happy lives. Some people suffer, but this is true for all people, and prejudices against the disabled arise only because their afflictions are externally visible (Saxton, 1988, pp.221-222). Lastly, she says people who attempt to control other people’s right to life argue from a particular biased and distorted perspective of healthy living. Only the disabled or suffering person should be able to make decisions concerning their own life or death (Saxton, 1988, pp.222-223). These are overgeneralised, oversimplified presumptions in my opinion. Disabilities vary greatly, and in extreme cases there can be good reason for disabled people to be treated differently and even denied some (inappropriate) opportunities. Further, ongoing the difficulties of life and death arguments are easily demonstrated by debates on euthanasia and abortion where disability is not even a factor.
Gillam, in seeking to defend PD and SA, identifies two discrimination arguments to refute. Firstly, the slippery slope argument. There is fear that less disabled people in world (resulting from PD and SA) will lead to diminishing support services and increased discrimination as the disabled are further marginalised (Gillam, 1999, p.164). Gillam responds that increasing volumes of women having children later in life will lead to increasing numbers of disabled children, therefore meaning SA will maintain current levels of disability in society. It also does not follow that funding will be reduced. It could even work in disabled people’s favour with the same money available and shared between fewer numbers. She also points out it is no more likely decreasing volumes of disabled people will increase discrimination that increasing volumes would decrease it (Gillam, 1999, p.164).
The second identified argument is that PD and SA are inherently discriminatory toward the disabled. She responds that assessing a person’s quality of life as low does not entail assessment that the person is of less moral value. You wouldn’t, for example, consider a cancer sufferer with low quality of life as having lower moral worth (Gillam, 1999, p.168). These are morally neutral assessments, she says, even though I believe they appeal to common human conceptions of what constitutes worthwhile life. Gillam goes on to highlight the low moral status of a foetus in comparison to a person and states therefore that an abnormal foetus identified by PD is a morally different entity to a disabled person. Conclusions for one entity simply do not carry to the other (Gillam, 1999, p.169). However, I think this makes a rather assuming statement about the low moral status of a foetus, in what is a highly contentious and separate debate of its own.
Gillam and Saxton argue on either sides of the fence regarding whether PD and SA are discriminatory to the disabled. Both put forward practical arguments that appeal to everyday reason and experience, but often make jumping assumptions that on their own are deeply controversial issues. For this reason a convincing conclusion is left wanting.
BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES
- Gillam , Lynn, 'Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled', Journal of Medical Ethics, 1999, vol. 25, pp. 163-171.
- Saxton, Marsha, 'Prenatal screening and discriminatory attitudes about disability', in Baruch, D'Adamo, & Seager (eds), Embryos, Ethics and Women's Rights: Exploring the new reproductive technologies, (Harrington Park Press, 1988), pp. 217-224.
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