Life, Death, Harm - Lucretius & Nagel

Lucretius believes it is irrational to fear death and attempts to explain it is a confusion of human thought that leads one to fearing death.

For Lucretius, it is not death that we fear; but the pain, suffering and loss accompanying it. His argument states that death itself is not experienced, because the event of death is the cessation of existence, and we cannot attribute anything negative (or positive) to that state, because there is no person - no subject - to attribute things to (Lucretius, 1957, p.123). To demonstrate this fact, Lucretius makes a comparison between prenatal and posthumous non-existence, arguing that prior to existence (prenatal) we had no cares, concerns, emotions, or pains, therefore after existence (posthumous) we will have none either (Lucretius, 1957, pp.121-122). He thinks it makes no sense to compare the contents of existence to non-existence, because non-existence lacks any possibility of such content.

Nagel (1970, pp.75-76), in response, argues that Lucretius has made a logical error in his reasoning. He believes Lucretius’ mistake is in assuming there needs to be a subject to experience harm, and to be harmed. He thinks you can be harmed objectively as well as subjectively, and that Lucretius limits his argument by overlooking this point. He gives some examples, like being betrayed by a friend but never finding out, or breaking a deathbed promise. In each case, for him, these actions attribute harm, but for Lucretius they would not. Nagel thinks it still makes sense to talk about harm in cases where the person is dead, because the person we’re referring to is really that person at a specific point in time during their life, not the physical remains or ashes they have become. He goes on to state that fear of death isn’t fear of non-existence, but a person’s fear of losing their future possibilities and having their hopes and wishes thwarted in death. The difference between prenatal and posthumous non-existence, then, is that in prenatal non-existence there is no subject to think about anything or to have any expectations and possibilities for the future, whereas in posthumous non-existence there is a loss of the possibilities and expectations which give meaning to life for the person who is or was once living.

Lucretius and Nagel differ in that they conclude different possibilities for a person after the event of their death. For Lucretius there are no possibilities; death is non-existence and there is no more to be said of a subject that once lived and no longer does. For Nagel there are possibilities that can be attributed to a person’s memory, and the subject as it existed in a certain time and place within their lifespan. Nagel thinks it wrong to harm a person’s memory, but the question then arises – is it actually the person, or merely the person’s memory that is really at stake?

REFERENCES:

§  Lucretius, The Nature of the Universe, (Penguin Classics, 1957), Book III 'Life and Mind', pp. 121-129

§  Nagel, Thomas, 'Death', in Nous, (Vol IV(1), 1970, pp73-80).