The Divine Command Theory of Morality

The Divine Command Theory (DCT) is an attempt to ground morality in divine essence. It is a way of explaining human morality as derived from the will of a god, or the God (Smith, 2009, p.3). As with any theory of a theistic nature it has been open to criticism and debate, with possibly its most famous critique dating back to Ancient Greece, and Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. This essay examines the DCT and, using a modern context, explores the main objections derived from that text: the Euthyphro dilemma and the Pluralism objection[MW1] .

                The DCT seeks to explain the moral choices of a human being as objective, universal, and thus so because God wills or commands it. When faced with moral choice, we decide right or wrong based upon God's will and this binds us all to the same transcendent morality. How we obtain knowledge of this morality is debatable – it might be through religious scriptures or it might be something programmed into our essence. But if it comes from the scriptures, then we have a problem explaining the moral actions of an atheist – they have no faith, or motivation derived through fear/love of God (Smith, 2009, pp.6-7). If it comes from programmed essence, then how is it that we seem to have free will when presented with a moral dilemma, and can go against an inclination for moral action? Indeed, why some people persistently make moral choices contradicting the majority's sense of normality is a problem – kleptomaniacs for example. Ultimately it is unclear whether the DCT provides divine inclination (i.e. God's will), or divine determinism (i.e. God's authority). Either way, the DCT is controversial and has attracted debate for many years (Austin, 2006).

                The three prominent objections in Plato's Euthyphro are the first and second horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, and the pluralism objection. The Euthyphro dilemma is an argument that, put in modern terms, equates to: Is something morally right or wrong because God tells us it is so (first horn of the dilemma), or does God tell us something is morally right or wrong because it is so (second horn of the dilemma) (Smith, 2009, p.5)? The Pluralism objection questions the feasibility or moral objectivity within the framework of multiple religions and/or gods. In Euthyphro it is a consequence of polytheistic religion and capricious/argumentative gods (Plato, 1979, pp.175-176). In contemporary society it is a consequence of multiple world faiths - each holding contrasting views on the details of morality[MW2]  (Austin, 2006, 7d).

                If we take a look at the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma we see a theistic problem. If something is morally right or wrong because God tells us it is so then tomorrow God could just change His mind about something we presently consider abhorrent/inherently wrong and decree it morally right, for example torture. This would lead to the conclusion that all morality is arbitrary and lacking in unchangeable objectivity (Byrne, 2007, 1.2). Right or wrong would just be random choice of the Divine. Surprisingly, this correlates with what I see in the world. I choose torture as an example specifically due to its controversial standing in contemporary debate. In the “War against terror”, the US has been seen to detain suspects without trial and to torture them for confessions (Lowrey, 2009). They say this is done in the name of national and international security to which some people agree, and some don't. Maybe God decided in this instance that it was justified. I think it is possible He changed His mind on this issue for the greater good, willing a select group of people to take a certain moral action against the norm, while maintaining the majority morality to be disapproving of torture, because in most individual cases this was the right course of action. The point here is that if the DCT is true, then we are obliged to God's will regardless of what He deems right or wrong.

Speaking[MW3]  outside the constraints of dogma I don't believe that morality has to be a consistent standard at any given time – it only needs to be what is ultimately right. If God exists and created us then He should be in the best position to decide moral correctness for any particular individual, at any given time, as the situation requires. There is no need for objective standards that apply to all at all times; there can be motives specific to an individual person and circumstance that are still decreed by God. Take the analogy of a spider – it is one of God's creatures and bound by God's will. In many species when a female spider has mated with a male spider, she then eats him for nutrition through pregnancy and birth (Tufty, B 1956, p.282). This is the cycle of life, no-one deems this immoral, it is nature and God's will. If a human did this it would be seen immoral and unnatural. That is because God has decided what suits the situation for that creature. One may argue humans have reason and spiders do not; but if the DCT is true, then reason is either irrelevant or just an unfortunate obstacle to God's will[MW4] .

                The second horn of the Euthyphro dilemma asks the opposite of the first, and creates another sticky problem for faith. If God tells us something is morally right or wrong because it is so, then morality precedes God and is above Him (Smith, 2009, p.5). This is seen as a serious problem for nearly all faiths because God is supposedly omnipotent and omniscient. Breaking it down, the first part of the objection goes something like this:

2. Omnipotent beings are all powerful

1.1. Morality is above/before God

1. God does not have the power to change morality

C. God is not omnipotent[MW5] 

But the inference from 1.1. to 1. has no grounding. Firstly, just because morality precedes God does not mean He can't change it. There is no reason for believing this.[MW6]  Secondly, it becomes an irrelevant issue because He gave humans free will, and by interfering with morality would be breaking His own rules. We must assume there is free will, or good moral acts would be obligatory and we would be incapable of anything bad. This is perhaps why there are scriptures/commandments; to give us rules to live by while preserving our capacity for free will. The second argument of objection[MW7]  works in much the same way as the first:

2. Omniscient beings are all knowing

1.1. Morality is above/before God

1. Morality existed before God created/knew about it

C. God is not omniscient

This is trickier. But perhaps if we look at it from the angle that God is good (Augustine, 1979, p310), and God is not bad, we might say; anything God tells us is good, and anywhere our free will leads us in opposition to this is bad. Then there is no decision made. God chooses everything good, humans choose everything bad. We create the dichotomy. Nothing precedes God; it only works in contradiction to Him. God's omniscience is therefore not in question[MW8] . This might prompt regression to the omnipotence argument, but the free will refutation still stands, and justifies human ability to choose defiance of God's will.

                The final objection from Euthyphro is the Pluralism objection. Socrates poses the thought that if there are multiple deities and they disagree, then there can be no objective morality. One god might believe something is moral, while another believes it is immoral (Plato, 1979, pp.175-176). Today we see multiple religions in the world each with contrasting ideas on what constitutes morality, and if they can't all be right then similarly there is no objective morality. However, isolate the argument for the moment to Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and we have three religions which worship the same God but hold different views on His will. For this I refer to my conclusion of the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma - God knows best for us and that will vary given who/what we are  (“one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter” (Shapiro, 2006, p.669)). This variation is dictated through various scriptures (Bible, Koran, Tanakh) and evolved over the ages. Human free will is preserved, and God's will is given capacity to adapt. This is also effective if we look at polytheistic religions, as we see that gods here are either:

i.                     Subordinate to another (Zeus/the Olympians (Harris & Platzner, 2008 , p.182))

ii.                    Serving different functions (segregated authority (Harris & Platzner, 2008 , p.184))

iii.                  The same God in many forms (Hinduism (Jayaram, 2010))

iv.                  A combination of the above

In any case the DCT survives; as morality is referred to a single deity and the “God knows best” refutation applies.

                Aside from the divergent doctrines of religions past and present, we know little if anything about the nature of God, the gods, or any other divine essence. For this reason it is impossible to make argument for or against matters of a divine nature without resorting to assumptions based on human experience. Whether the DCT provides inclination or determines our moral actions we may never know. But if, like me, you've ever changed your mind on the moral status of something, you might also agree human experience suggests we are moral agents, and have capacity to use our heads even when the heart tells us otherwise. You might also feel what is morally correct for one place, time and being isn't necessarily so for another. With these two assumptions we can combat the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma and justify the varying views of the Pluralism objection. One day humans may be sent a message from divine powers telling them how things are really supposed to be. But until that day comes, assumption, experience and reason will allow the DCT of morality to compete with any other view on offer. 

REFERENCES

• Augustine, St.;  Knowles, D (ed.) 1972, "Extract" in Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, Unknown location (e-reserve), Unknown publisher (e-reserve), pp. 308-311
• Austin, MW 2006, Divine Command Theory, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed January 20 2010, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c>.
• Byrne, P 2007, Moral Arguments for the Existence of God, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed January 15 2010, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god>, Section 1.2.
• Harris, SL & Platzner, G 2008, Classical Mythology, McGraw Hill, New York, p.182
• Jayaram, V 2010, Why Hindus worship so many gods and goddesses?, Hindu website, viewed January 18 2010, <http://www.hinduwebsite.com/hinduism/h_polytheism.asp>.
• Lowrey, A 2009, The Torture Timeline, Foreign Policy, Washington DC, viewed January 18 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4891> 
• Plato;  Hamilton, E (ed.), Cairns, H (ed.) 1979, “Euthyphro” in  The Collected Dialogues of Plato including the Letters, Princeton, Princeton University Press
• Shapiro, F (ed.) 2006, The Yale Book of Quotations, Yale University Press, USA, p. 669.

• Smith, N 2009, Lecture on Morality and Religion (Week 5), PHI110 SP4, Macquarie University.

• Tufty, B 1956, 'Widows and Tarantulas' The Science News-Letter, vol. 69, no. 18, p.282

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Augustine, St.;  Knowles, D (ed.) 1972, "Extract" in Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, Unknown location (e-reserve), Unknown publisher (e-reserve), pp. 308-311
• Austin, MW 2006, Divine Command Theory, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed January 20 2010, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/divine-c>.
• Byrne, P 2007, Moral Arguments for the Existence of God, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed January 15 2010, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-arguments-god>, Section 1.2.
• Hare, J 2006, Religion and Morality,  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed January 15 2010, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-morality>.
• Harris, SL & Platzner, G 2008, Classical Mythology, McGraw Hill, New York, pp.182-188
• Jayaram, V 2010, Why Hindus worship so many gods and goddesses?, Hindu website, viewed January 18 2010, <http://www.hinduwebsite.com/hinduism/h_polytheism.asp>.
• Lowrey, A 2009, The Torture Timeline, Foreign Policy, Washington DC, viewed January 18 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4891> 
• Murphy, M 2008, Theological Voluntarism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed January 15 2010, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/voluntarism-theological>.
• Plato;  Hamilton, E (ed.), Cairns, H (ed.) 1979, “Euthyphro” in  The Collected Dialogues of Plato including the Letters, Princeton, Princeton University Press
• Smith, N 2009, Lecture on Morality and Religion (Week 5), PHI110 SP4, Macquarie University.
• Shapiro, F (ed.) 2006, The Yale Book of Quotations, Yale University Press, USA, p. 669.
• Tufty, B 1956, 'Widows and Tarantulas' The Science News-Letter, vol. 69, no. 18, p.282

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 [MW1]excellent. Add a sentence stating what you'll conclude, to complete this and give the reader an indication of where you're going.

 [MW2]good, nice and clear

 [MW3]new paragraph here, to break this up, and because you move to a different focus here.

 [MW4]interesting response to this horn.

 [MW5]nice, very clear

 [MW6]The reasoning in this paragraph could be clearer. I think to do this you need to clarify the sense in which you're understanding 'precedes'—logical priority vs temporal or perhaps in terms of power?

It would be useful to the whole following section to explain the role of free will here further.

 [MW7]say a bit more here to explain why this is part of the objection, as it is less obvious than the problem with omnipotence. That is if one accepted this horn and so thought that morality was independent of God's will, it would be consistent to say that God still has (the best/only) knowledge of morality. So the reason for including this discussion just needs a bit more clarification.

 [MW8]expand on this, for clarity.