This essay discusses Epicurus' prescriptive doctrine for living the good life; his 'Letter to Menoeceus'. It examines and evaluates his concept of 'primary native good', which pleasures we may seek, and how virtue is tied to pleasure.
Epicurus describes pleasure as our 'primary native good'. Pleasure is ‘primary’ because it is the “starting point and goal of a happy life”.[1] It is ‘native’ because pleasure is the driver behind every course of action we take. Everything done is for the purpose of avoiding pain or mental distress, and this discomfort is caused by a lack of pleasure. And it is ‘good’ because pleasure is the quality we use to measure how good something is. What Epicurus wants us to understand, is that pleasure is central to the good life for humans.[2]
However the Letter doesn’t sanction pursuit of all pleasures. On the contrary, Epicurus thinks pleasure is often misconceived for extravagant over-indulgence, whereas in reality pleasure is freedom from pain and fear.[3] Pain might come in the form of our basic physical needs not being met, like starvation. Fear might come by focussing on the negatives of our existence, like death.[4] But the Epicurean way is about walking the fine line between lows of pain or fear, and debauched highs, maintaining equilibrium along the way.[5] When we achieve this counterbalance, he argues, there is calmness in our soul and we cease to need anything more.[6] As long as the pain of starvation is averted, for example, simple foods provide comparable pleasure to luxurious ones. Additionally, abstaining has the double effect of both preparing us for when we don't have much and furnishing us with delight when we do get the occasional luxury. Therefore, it's the simple life one should lead - one that provides only what is required for health and life.[7]
But we are prone to fail at the simple life without prudent application.[8] Epicurus argues a fear of death drives us to try and make the most of life, and through this misguidance we end up with neurotic anxieties causing us fear and pain, which are palliated by overindulgence in unnecessary pleasures.[9] Our focus on death diverts our focus on life, and life (indeed, the good life) is the only thing that should matter to us.[10]
His advice is that while I shouldn't allow myself to be in a state of distress, it's also important my desires aren't fulfilled unrestrained. Investigating our actions through “sober thinking” will guide us to true pleasure, thinks Epicurus, because reflection affords us good judgement, and that is a value we should hold higher even than philosophy itself. All virtues stem from good judgement (prudence) we are informed. Taking justice, nobility, and sensibility as Epicurean virtues; Epicurus holds that it is impossible to lead a virtuous but unpleasant life.[11]
Having analysed Epicurus' argument, I have three objections to inquire upon. Firstly, love is omitted. Love is an alternate candidate for 'primary native good', as many would agree love to be the “starting point and goal of the happy life”.[12] Romantic love may not have appeared in literature until much later,[13] and that love was conceived of differently in Ancient Greece,[14]but surely it existed. Friendly love is addressed in Leading Doctrines,[15] but not love of a life partner, nor self love. The driver behind every course of action we take, whether it be self love, or love of another, it's how we measure the good life in contemporary society; the loving family, the loving wife, self-confidence. Perhaps the logic of Epicurus’ argument deems love too prone to excessive pleasures and pains. “Tis better to have loved and lost than never to have loved at all” said Lord Tennyson.[16] Epicurus might think this risk too great. Love is a source of both our misery and happiness – which is greater could never be measured accurately.
Secondly, I think we should treat ourselves to unnecessary things if we have the means. Epicurus thinks we should lead the simple austere life, but if we operate with good judgement, and therefore within our means, we should be able to live a life of modest luxury. Constant denial of the things we can have might lead to resentment for the doctrine, a form of mental distress, and subsequent failure to engage in the good life.
Finally, I believe a virtuous life may lead us to take actions which result in personal harm - the very thing Epicurus thinks we need to avoid in living the good life.[17] Imagine a courageous soldier injured, even crippled, assisting a comrade. Or a charitable person who likes to give, but ends up embezzled by opportunist deceivers who need no charity. For me, these virtuous people could be viewed as leading wretched unpleasant lives. Epicurus may argue that good judgement would not allow such mistakes. But with just intent, and some good to the outcome (the soldier saved, the deserving who received charity), even good judgement leads to unpleasantness. It’s too sweeping a statement to say all virtue leads to pleasure – for the soldier virtue only has value for another at self expense, for the philanthropist it presupposes everyone to lead virtuous lives so we are not short changed. Perhaps, Epicurus thinks if our reflective self is in order we will have pleasure knowing we’ve done the right thing regardless.
In conclusion, Epicurus' Letter describes his philosophy for the good life. It is a simple life of pleasure through the avoidance of pain, fear and over-elaborate extravagance. It's the safe middle between high and low. But it also describes a life void of things that our contemporary world could not separate from the good life. Love, prudent luxury, and a life lived to according to our own choices of virtue might have been frowned upon in the Epicurean world. Living in the modern rather than Epicurean world, I cannot agree with Epicurus' philosophy in its entirety. But I can say it was a pleasure to have reflected upon.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Epicurus; Cooper, David E. "Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' and 'Leading Doctrines'" in Ethics: The Classic Readings , Cooper, David E. , 1998 , 47-58
Thomas Gould, "The Platonic love distinguished from the rival theories of the nature of love: The Christian, the Romantic and the Freudian theories", in Platonic love (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963), p.1-18.
Nicholas Smith, "Lecture on Epicureanism", (Macquarie University: PHI110 SP4, 2009)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/ (1. Socrates Strangeness)
[1] Epicurus; Cooper, David E. "Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' in Ethics: The Classic Readings , Cooper, David E. , 1998 , p51
[2] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p51
[3] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p51
[4] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p50
[5] Epicurus; Cooper, David E. "Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' and 'Leading Doctrines' in Ethics: The Classic Readings , Cooper, David E. , 1998 , p47
[6] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p50
[7] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p51
[8] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p51
[9] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p52
[10] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p49-50
[11] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p52
[12] Epicurus, 'Letter to Menoeceus' , p51
[13] Thomas Gould, "The Platonic love distinguished from the rival theories of the nature of love: The Christian, the Romantic and the Freudian theories", in Platonic love (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1963), p.8-10.
[14] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/socrates/ (1. Socrates Strangeness)
[15] Epicurus; Cooper, David E. "Epicurus, 'Leading Doctrines' in Ethics: The Classic Readings , Cooper, David E. , 1998 , p56
[17] Nicholas Smith, “6. Pleasure, Virtue, Justice”, in Lecture on Epicureanism, (Macquarie University: PHI110 SP4, 2009)
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