Euthanasia - Rachels' 'Smith and Jones' thought experiment

Rachels’ Smith and Jones example attempts to show that there is no moral difference between an action which causes death, and an inaction which directly allows death to occur. This is related to a debate relating to euthanasia about the moral difference between killing a person, and letting them die.

                The Smith and Jones example (Rachels, 1975, p.493) runs as follows; Smith and Jones would be in line to get an inheritance if their 6 year old cousin wasn’t around. The pair separately decide to try and kill the young man, thereby clearing the way for them to receive the inheritance. In one scenario and outcome Smith waits for the cousin to have a bath, and then sneaks in and drowns him, making the death look accidental. In the other scenario and outcome, Jones waits for the cousin to have a bath, but as he walks into the bathroom to drown him, finds the cousin has slipped over, knocking himself unconscious and lying face down in the bath, already in the process of drowning. Instead of helping him (or assisting with the drowning process already occurring), Jones merely lets the cousin drown ‘accidentally’ thereby accomplishing the deed without action. Rachels point is that there is no moral difference between Smith’s action of drowning the cousin (killing) and Jones inaction of stopping the cousin from drowning (letting die), each of them are just as (morally) responsible for the cousin’s death.  

                It could be objected at this point that Rachels is forming an overgeneralisation out of his example, which he rightly highlights himself (Rachels, 1975, p.494). There is certainly a valid claim that the actions of Smith and Jones are equally morally wrong, however there are a number of elements to the example which mean it is only useful in the single scenario. For instance, if we compare killing and letting die in the Smith and Jones case to a real world case of euthanasia, then there is little in common between them. The analogy does not appear to be strong and holds too many particulars to be applied to a range of different scenarios. Most strikingly, there is intention to do harm in the cases of Smith and Jones, whereas with euthanasia (killing or letting die) the intention is to alleviate harm.

                In sum, Rachels believes active euthanasia (killing) and passive euthanasia (letting die) are no different, and attempts to demonstrate this with his example of the nefarious Smith and Jones. Whilst his example certainly seems to provide valid reasons why the cases of Smith and Jones are no different, it is too particular and circumstantial an example to be extended to all cases of killing versus letting die. For this reason Rachels fails in his demonstration, even though he does open the way for some thought provoking and on-going debate.

REFERENCES:

•  Rachels, James, 'Active and Passive Euthanasia', New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 292, no. 2 (Jan. 1975). Reprinted in: Steinbock, Killing and Letting Die; Rachels, Moral Problems , Third edition, (Harper & Row, 1979); Beauchamp & Walters (eds.) Contemporary Issues in Bioethics First edition, (Dickenson, 1978)