Death is but the natural end to life, yet humans typically fear it as the greatest harm there can be. In this essay I distinguish between different types of existence, to both explain why we characterise life and death as we do, and to show why we hold confused opinions about what really constitutes death and the dead. I examine Nagel’s problems with death as a harm, and conclude that when we speak of harming the dead we are really confused about who or what is being harmed, and that death truly is a harm to the dead when their expectations for life are thwarted by an untimely passing.
Much of the debate about death as harm, and the dead being harmed derives from confusion about what constitutes existence. Existence can be broadly divided into three types; physical, subjective, and objective. Physical existence appertains to the organic material comprising our bodies. Spermatozoon, ovum, human being, and rotting corpse all fall within this category. Subjective existence exists in the subject of existence (SoE) - a person - through rationality, and through memories or expectations of experiences pertaining to the self. It is Locke’s “thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking think in different times and places” (1975, p.335). Conversely, objective existence, or ‘objects of existence’ (OoE), exist within the memories or expectations of experiences of others – people who are aware, however vaguely, of our physical and/or subjective existence. These are the memories, expectations, and thoughts others have about us, and it persists beyond the boundaries of subjective (and sometimes physical) existence (Nagel, 1970, p78). It is OoE that much of the confusion about death and the dead is manifest.
In making this distinction of existence we can understand why life is characterised the way it is in human society. To illustrate; we do not typically consider the waste of sperm or eggs as death to potential persons (even if this is what they are) (Tooley, 1998, p.122), yet there is much debate about the moral status of a foetus, and it’s potentiality for personhood. In the case of sperm and eggs this is because although there is a physical existence, there is neither a SoE nor OoE to speak of. There is no person to speak of, as per Locke’s definition, and few people would have any strong expectations (OoE) for that sperm or egg (it may be argued that religious people who consider the waste of sperm a sin do so because they have created OoE for the potential subjects within that sperm). In contrast, a foetus, once known to parents, or anyone, satisfies both physical and objective existence. Once people have thoughts about the foetus, they are generating OoE for the foetus and person it could be. It is often debated at which point a foetus becomes morally significant to society. I argue it becomes morally significant when there are OoE in society for the foetus in question, even if a foetus, lacking personhood, is still morally subordinate to a being satisfying physical, objective, and subjective existence. It is these same confusions we have about the notion of life, that blur our conceptions of death and the dead.
One definition of death is: the permanent end of conscious and physical life (Pitcher, 1984, p183). However conscious and physical life does not always end in tandem. While an end to physical life is often sufficient for death, it is not in all contexts necessary, and while an end to conscious life is necessary for death, it is not in all contexts sufficient. This demonstrates that the SoE and physical existence are treated separately in many cases, even if everyday meaning sometimes conflates them. The problem is, even when a being’s physical and conscious life ends, OoE persist through the medium of other people’s minds. Pitcher (1984, p.184) illustrates the way in which people complicatedly perceive death by making a distinction between ante-mortem (a person at some stage of their life) and post-mortem (dead person in death) persons. Ante-mortem people do not exist other than as OoE within the minds of living people who hold some thought about them, but exist they do; and if OoE are in the form of expectations, wishes and hopes for the subject of death, then those OoE can be harmed, and if death thwarts the realisation of any of those OoE then we may also consider death as a harm to the person who has died.
Nagel (1970, pp.75-76) identifies three problems with the notion of death as a harm. First, something must be positively unpleasant to be bad, and when you are dead you cannot experience anything. I think the problem arises here because while the SoE no longer exists and cannot experience positive unpleasantness, a carrier of OoE relating to the dead person (i.e. a relative) can experience positive unpleasantness if the content of those OoE are contradicted in some way. For example, a mother who had hopes (OoE) that her deceased son would one day have children has been deprived of that hope being realised, much as the son was deprived of his hopes (OoE) for children. Secondly, Nagel asks; how we can assign misfortune to a dead ‘subject’, because as long as the subject exists the person is alive, and once they die the subject ceases to exist. Again though, the problem is elucidated by understanding the harm that can be assigned to OoE in others (for example, people who protest when a dead person’s wishes are not carried out posthumously). Though in such cases our instincts imply the dead have something to lose, it is really the living bearers of OoE that have something they could lose (Callahan, 1987, pp.343, 347). Finally, Nagel finds issue with Lucretius’ asymmetry between posthumous and prenatal non-existence; believing time preceding birth cannot be considered a loss, whereas time succeeding death is a deprivation of life (1970, p. 79). I believe the asymmetry arises because OoE exist during posthumous non-existence (having been collected by others throughout the subject’s life), whereas few, if any, OoE exist during prenatal existence. Thus in posthumous non-existence others have OoE that can be contradicted, whereas in prenatal existence they do not, and this is where the true asymmetry lies.
However despite the fact it appears as though OoE in others are the only victim of harm in the event of death or after, it should be conceded that if death is harm because it deprives someone of something (Nagel, 1970, p.74), then the person who dies is especially harmed by death. This is because for someone (a SoE) to have any thoughts (OoE) about themselves or others, it is a pre-requisite is for them to be a SoE, and the consequence of death, is that all of the OoE their SoE contained suddenly cease to exist.
To explain further, let us distinguish OoE-as-memories from OoE-as-expectations (for our purpose I will leave out any other type of OoE). OoE-as-memories are experiences we already possess, and which death cannot deprive us of. OoE-as-expectations are unrealised experiences that might become memories, and in death we are deprived of the opportunity for these to be realised. We think it tragic, for example, if someone dies young, but not so much if they are old (Nagel, 1970, p.80). I think is because a younger person’s OoE (both in themself and others) will often comprise more of expectations than of memories, whereas an elderly person’s OoE will typically contain more memories than expectations. From a moral perspective I think it fair (in most cases) to privilege the loss of OoE-as-expectations as greater than the loss of OoE-as-memories, because holders of OoE-as-memories have already received any potential good conveyed by the experiences, whereas holders of OoE-as-expectations have not yet received any potential good. Of course, potential bad might replace potential good in both cases, and this would be why we sometimes refer to death as a blessing for individuals who live a troubled or potentially troubled existence. But a rewarding life is constituted by both good and bad experiences, and in death we are deprived of having either.
In this essay I have argued that existence needs be understood through a three way definition. My aim has been to show that Nagel’s problems can be answered and that while the dead cannot be harmed after death, death should be considered a harm when our existence is filled more by expectations for life that it is with experiences of life. The contents of life are our experiences, and if we are left wanting for those, then we are left wanting for life. I hope when I die, I am left wanting for very little of life’s experiences, and that those who persist in existence beyond my time might understand; I can no longer be harmed in any way. Only my memory through them is in any way vulnerable, and only they will have the existence to pass moral judgement on any injury that should befall it.
REFERENCES
· Nagel, Thomas. "Death" Nous , 4:1 (1970), pp.73-80
· Callahan, Joan C. "On harming the dead" Ethics , 97:2 (Jan., 1987), pp.341-352
· Locke, John. "Of identity and diversity - extract" in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Locke, John; Nidditch, Peter H., (1975), pp.328-347
· Tooley, Michael. "Personhood" in A Companion to Bioethics , Kuhse, Helga; Singer, Peter, (1998), pp.117-126
· Pitcher, George. "The misfortunes of the dead" American Philosophical Quarterly, 21:2 (Apr., 1984), pp.183-188
BIBLIOGRAPHY
· Lucretius. "Extract" in On the Nature of the Universe , Lucretius; Latham, R. E. , (1951), pp.121-129
· Nagel, Thomas. "Death" Nous , 4:1 (1970), pp.73-80
· Callahan, Joan C. "On harming the dead" Ethics , 97:2 (Jan., 1987), pp.341-352
· Locke, John. "Of identity and diversity - extract" in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , Locke, John; Nidditch, Peter H., (1975), pp.328-347
· Tooley, Michael. "Personhood" in A Companion to Bioethics , Kuhse, Helga; Singer, Peter, (1998), pp.117-126
· Pitcher, George. "The misfortunes of the dead" American Philosophical Quarterly, 21:2 (Apr., 1984), pp.183-188
· Levenbock, Barbara. “Harming Someone after His Death” Ethics, 94:3 (Apr., 1984), pp.407-419
· Marquis, Don. “Harming the Dead” Ethics, 96:1 (Oct., 1985), pp. 159-161
· Fred Feldman, 'Some Puzzles About the Evil of Death', Philosophical Review vol., 100:2 (April 1991), pp.205-227
No comments:
Post a Comment