Cherish Wisdom: John Rawls - Political Liberalism

It is said that John Rawls revolutionised political philosophy in the 20^th Century. By returning political philosophy to its traditional normative approach, and revisiting the question of political legitimacy, he set the table for a generation of political debate. In this essay I examine the arguments Rawls puts forward to explain the stability we see in contemporary liberal democracies, and the way in which political legitimacy is possible. I look at the key concepts Rawls describes to determine if they are practical or appropriate, and discover a well thought out argument that leaves little room to manoeuvre any convincing form of refutation.

Rawls’ primary aim in Political Liberalism is to understand how stability is possible in democratic societies when the population is comprised of a diversity of reasonable and general ‘comprehensive doctrines’. A comprehensive doctrine for Rawls is any moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine which applies to wide range of subjects and purports to explain what is of value to human life as a whole. These are the values that constitute the social aspect of human life (Rawls, 1993, pp.13-14), and any doctrine which cannot work in a democratic society is considered unreasonable and excluded (Rawls, 1997, p.801). Rawls accepts from the outset that these are a permanent fixture of society, but also notes they are inappropriate as the content of any political value system (Rawls, 1993, p.36, p.135). Any solution formulated to address the problem of political legitimacy will need to take this into consideration, and to somehow work with or around reasonable comprehensive doctrines.

What Rawls attempts to construct as a solution, is a freestanding conception of political values based on principles that any citizen would advocate and situated above all forms of comprehensive doctrine. These values are only applicable to what Rawls calls the ‘basic structure’ of society; which applies to the institutions of political, social and economic affairs (Rawls, 1993, p.11, p.137), and is also his primary subject of justice through justice as fairness (Rawls, 1972, p.7). His goal, is to separate political values from social values (Murphy, 1998, p.264), believing that any aim seeking to strike a balance between the two is wrong if we are aiming for a well ordered society (Bellamy/Hollis, 1995, p.14). The political realm is derived from the idea of society as a fair system of co-operation (Wenar, 2008, section-3.4), and conceived of entirely separately to any comprehensive doctrine (Klosko, 1997, p.642). Its principles are constructed according to the idea of justice as fairness (Rawls, 1972, p.12), that is; liberty, equality and reciprocity in political, civil and economic respects (Rawls, 1993, p.139). There is no dependency on any comprehensive doctrine, and it works as a freestanding, separate, concept (Rawls, 1987, p.4). For Rawls, justice is political not metaphysical (1985).

This freestanding conception of political values can however, and does, operate as a constituent part of any reasonable comprehensive doctrines when debates arise (Hittinger, 1994, pp.590-591). In these situations the reasonable comprehensive doctrine actually works in conjunction with the freestanding conception of justice to provide a common ground for argument. The reasonable comprehensive doctrines support the political conception of justice (Rawls, 1997, p.776) and while everyone argues from the perspective of their own reasonable comprehensive doctrine(s) they only ever partake in political debate via the principles permitted within the political domain. These principles, because agreed and understood by all, mean that despite the unique starting point of any individual’s argument, there is always common ground which those involved can agree on as the basis for discussion. For Rawls, this is the notion of an ‘overlapping consensus’. It is an agreement similar to a social contract, whereby individuals agree on certain values in order to obtain liberty in their everyday actions throughout society. However, the overlapping consensus is superior to other forms of liberalism (such as Mill’s individuality and Kant’s autonomy), because while they try to prescribe a formula encompassing the full scope of human life, Rawls political form of liberalism is restricted to only the political aspects of human existence (Rawls, 1987, p.6). In this realm the only real concept of significance is a shared conception of justice as fairness (Mittleman, 2002, pp.355). Outside of this political realm citizens are still free to agree or disagree on particular issues within the framework of their own reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Wenar, 2008, section-3.5), as long as their reasoning is compatible with the terms of justice as fairness. It is left to citizens themselves to affirm how the political conception of justice is related to their own reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Rawls, 1993, p38), and it is through this conceptual device, that Rawls hopes to conceive of a legitimate system for political and civil society.

So far so good, but what difficulties does this view entail? One problem might be that Rawls, as a philosopher, is thinking about the indefinite future and a permanent technology for political justice, whereas politicians, who are not always philosophers, rarely look beyond their immediate electoral benefits (Rawls, 1987, p.24). A politician, for example, only looks towards their next election when setting policies and policy agendas, which makes it feasible that their proposals could disregard values derived from justice as fairness if an appeal to the comprehensive doctrines of a voting majority at that time is more likely to win them the next election. A corollary problem might then be that if elections promises and policy decisions are strongly directed by voter doctrines, society is really just a precarious modus vivendi (Rawls, 1987, p.10). Rawls says we should consider the overlapping consensus as superior to a mere balance of power, but what if unreasonable comprehensive doctrines spread until they overwhelm the liberal democratic society (Wenar, 2008, section-3.5)? This may seem an unlikely in advanced democratic societies, but by isolating the political into a realm all of its own, and making this realm the only concern of government and the state, we create the problem of reducing visibility of society from both upward and downward perspectives. Firstly, for example, there’s no way of knowing if the comprehensive doctrines converging upwards into the political realm are at all reasonable. Unreasonable doctrines may well have the capacity to sneak up and overwhelm society before it is able to respond (Ingram, 2003, p.366), corroding Rawls’ system of justice from within. Secondly, if we look downwards, then when working only from within the overlap of the political realm and by taking all other discussion off the political table we run the risk of marginalising people’s views. These are the ones that are most important to them, and which constitute their social existence. People’s ideas (good or bad) have the potential to be ignored or deemed irrelevant to government and state interests, and justice as fairness appears to be undermined as true value of the system. What could prompt Rawls to promote such a narrow space for the political agenda? Perhaps the isolation of the political realm is simply a useful device for Rawls to reduce the amount of consent required to make political power legitimate within his system (Christiano, 2008, section-5.1). It certainly does seem as though he’s attacked the problem of consent by simply removing the any requirement that existed in the first place, but does this make it legitimate?

Ultimately, Rawls’ argument is an attempt to provide justification and legitimacy for the exercise of political power, and I agree the only way that power can legitimised is if it lies within the overlapping consensus. The solution to the problem of legitimacy is for power to only ever be exercised within the political realm alone, and to leave the social aspects of society as they wish to be. This is because while the political realm is supported by all the personal doctrines of the population, on its own it is comprised of nothing more than a freestanding conception of justice - justice as fairness - based on ideas already implicit in a democratic society (Wenar, 2008, section-3.4). Citizens are consenting both within their own realm of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and within the political realm of overlapping consensus, and this is compatible with a variety of different psychologies, cultures, and beliefs. The only alternative would be the imposition of a regime through the oppressive use of state power (Rawls, 1987, p.4), and this is not legitimate, regardless whether the imposed regime is liberal or not. The state would have to coerce its population into a uniform model of acceptable values, either by enforcing particular doctrines, outlawing particular doctrines, or possibly even doing both (Gardbaum, 1991, p.1366). Unsurprisingly this is unreasonable for Rawls, because then you are back to a mere modus vivendi. An attempt like this could be likened to Hobbes’ attempt at peace through absolutist power (Gray, 2000, p.163), and I would like to think we have progressed somewhat since the 15^th century. It is a far cry from democracy, and not a stable system for modern society. Dissent and unrest would still arise, and even Hobbes, with his absolutist doctrine, conceded that while a political power may restrict citizen’s actions, the control of conscience and thought were beyond the ability of any political power (Murphy, 1998, p.270). History has demonstrated this through the regimes of fundamentalist religious dictators and thrones claimed through the divine right of monarchs. Unreasonable comprehensive doctrines such as these cannot be considered permissible anywhere within a democratic society (Rawls, 1997, pp.805-806). So for Rawls, the goal is not to dampen the variety of doctrines in society (this is futile), but to embrace them. In fact, it is disagreement amongst citizens that encourages constructive debate, and facilitates a growth and improvement of the population’s knowledge (Rawls, 1997, p.799). It is this difference of opinion amongst individuals in society that is the catalyst to our development as the human race. We need to allow people to find their own way in everyday life, while preserving political values that are of benefit and agreement to all. In this way the idea of overlapping consensus is similar to the ideas of Rousseau, in that each person shares in a general will applicable to all (correlating to Rawls’ freestanding conception of political values), yet may also hold a contrasting view (comprehensive doctrine) that is in some way segregated from being within the political realm (Russell, 1946, p.633). But I think Rawls is superior to Rousseau, because his thought never seeks to quieten dissenters, or to force them to be free.

Rawls believes the key to power and legitimacy in society is an overlapping consensus of political liberalism. He understands that human values are contained within a myriad of conceptions, and we must neither impose nor attempt to quiet what people hold sacred. Politics needs to be held aloft, in a realm where justice as fairness is the only rule of order, and agreement can be found by all. If we find objection to Rawls view it is in the possibility that the society he describes may not survive, and that a return to all-encompassing comprehensive doctrines will be an outcome. The very fact we fear this, is a testament to our implicit acceptance that the overlapping consensus is right. His system is one of harmony not balance. It provides legitimacy in action, both to the individual and to the state, and succeeds in finding a mode of fairness where many other theorists failed. Rawls once said his justice as fairness was ‘political not metaphysical’ - but really, I think he just left room for both the political and the metaphysical to flourish in segregated harmony.

References

· Bellamy, Richard and Hollis, Martin. “Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 178 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-19

· Christiano, Tom. "Authority", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/authority/>

· Christman, John. "Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/autonomy-moral/>.

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· Gardbaum, Stephen A. “Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals after All”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 6 (Apr., 1991), pp. 1350-1371

· Gray, John. “Mill's Liberalism and Liberalism's Posterity”, The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1/2, Rights, Equality, and Liberty Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Law and Philosophy Lectures 1995-1997 (Jan. - Mar., 2000), pp. 137-165

· Hittinger, Russell. “John Rawls Political Liberalism”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Mar., 1994), pp. 585-602

· Ingram, David. “Between Political Liberalism and Postnational Cosmopolitanism: Toward an Alternative Theory of Human Rights”, Political Theory, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 359-391

· Klosko, George. “Political Constructivism in Rawl's Political Liberalism”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 635-646

· Mittleman, Alan S. “Toleration, Liberty, and Truth: A Parable”, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 95, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 353-372

· Murphy, Andrew R. “Rawls and a Shrinking Liberty of Conscience” The Review of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 247-276

· Rawls, John. "A Theory of Justice - extracts" in A Theory of Justice , (1972) , 3-22, 60-65, 136-161

· Rawls, John. "Extracts" in Political Liberalism , Rawls, John , (1993), 3-19,22-27,34-39,134-141

· Rawls, John. "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical", Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), pp. 223-251.

· Rawls, John. “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Spring, 1987), pp. 1-25

· Rawls, John. “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Summer, 1997), pp. 765-807

· Russell, Bertrand. “History of Western Philosophy”, (1946), Routledge Classics, London.

· Wenar, Leif. "John Rawls", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rawls/>.

Bibliography

· Bellamy, Richard and Hollis, Martin. “Liberal Justice: Political and Metaphysical”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 178 (Jan., 1995), pp. 1-19

· Berkowitz, Peter. “John Rawls and the Liberal Faith”, The Wilson Quarterly (1976-), Vol. 26, No. 2 (Spring, 2002), pp. 60-69