Social Contract Theory

Social Contract Theory (SCT) is a description of morality as a consequence of psychological egoism. In this essay I examine the SCT with particular reference to Hobbes, but take into account the ideas of Plato and Rawls. I argue that while the SCT has an ability to answer most moral problems, when it relies on the logically flawed premise of psychological egoism, it is unsupportable as a complete theory of morality.

SCT is the idea we are all implicitly bound by a reciprocal agreement to be moral.  It is an agreement with both fellow members of society to obey the Golden Rule (treat others as you expect to be treated) and with the state to follow legislated law as an objective framework for morality (Smith, 2009, p.16). The theory has elements going back to Plato. In Crito, Socrates is offered an opportunity to escape prison where he awaits execution after being tried by the state of Athens. He refuses on the grounds that despite believing his actions correct, as a lifelong citizen of Athens he had accepted the protection of its laws and justice, and therefore has a moral obligation to obey its justice (Plato, 2006, pp37-44). Socrates was  a man of uncommon conviction, and such adherence to the contract is a rarity. But it raises a valid issue. Why would we enter into this contract in the first place if it imposes laws and restrictions upon our lives and natural freedom?

                The answer provided by SCT is that we voluntarily enter into this agreement because psychological egoism – the theory that we are all naturally and primarily self-interested – is true. With no morality beyond our own self-regarding behaviour, we require the social contract to provide an objective basis for other-regarding morality (Smith, 2009, pp.15-16). Hobbes (1995, pp.53-61) articulates a vision of what society would be like without the contract, and dubs it the ‘State of Nature’ (SoN). He thinks in a world of limited resources, with equal needs amongst self-interested individuals (Rachels, 1999, p144), no-one would be willing to share and each man would be in brutal competition with his neighbour. People would steal, attack, and kill to possess what they covet, and do the same to protect what they have. There would be no “mine or thine”. Such 'society' would breed mistrust, making cooperation and corollary progress impossible. Life would be horrendous. Thus according to the SCT we voluntarily give up this freedom to steal from, attack and kill our fellow man, in return for the freedom from it happening to us (Smith, 2009, p.16). Objective morality through the social contract becomes a necessary consequence of psychological egoism, and exists due to the realisation we could never flourish without it.

Rachels (1999, pp.152-154) thinks one of the main reasons the SCT of morality has been influential is because it answers many of the problems philosophers have with the subject. Firstly, it provides a system for morality. If we all follow the Golden Rule it will mutually benefit everyone. Therefore murder, theft and lying are out, kindness, generosity and honesty are in. Secondly, it explains why we should follow this system. Without it society would collapse and we would all end up living in Hobbes' dreadful SoN. Thirdly, it establishes an account for moral objectivity i.e. morality is not left solely to subjective preference, but derives from an overarching mandate applicable to all (Kymlicka, 1991, p.189). And finally, it tells us what happens when we don’t follow the system; we get punished. Breach the contract, and you lose the protection it provided from harm. So in administering justice, those who have been wronged (typically the state), may punish offenders by means that would normally be deemed immoral. Thus, it becomes permissible to imprison someone who steals. Or in Socrates’ case, to end his life for being a danger to society.

However the SCT has other problems too, like free-riding. Free-riding is when someone doesn’t follow the moral system because being immoral is more advantageous. They rely (free-ride) on others morality under the contract to provide societal protection, and take the best of both worlds without risking a reversion of society to the SoN. Plato, as an example, recounts Glaucon’s tale ‘The Ring of Gyges’, whereby a shepherd finds an invisibility ring and uses it to successfully perform evil deeds and gain power without ever getting caught (Plato, 1993, pp.447-449). The conclusion is: why should someone be moral if it is in their benefit to be immoral and they can get away with it? My answer is that there is nothing like the ring in the real world to provide such a cloak of anonymity or guarantee of concealment. SCT answers the free-rider problem with fear. I think few moral theories base their objectivity in moral determinism, and the SCT is no different. It purports to provide inclination for morality, but not to force it on all people in all instances. In most situations people will refrain from immoral acts for fear of being caught (because that means losing the protection of the contract and being punished), but there are occasions where people do not. I concede the SCT is susceptible to free-riding, but only as much as any other moral theory.

Another problem levelled at the SCT is that it is fictional. However aside from that fact it has only ever been intended an implicit moral theory (Rachels, 1999, p.158), for me, all of the moral behaviour required to avoid Hobbes’ SoN seems actually covered by law in our modern society – murder, theft, assault etc. The things that aren’t covered by law, such as helping an elderly person with their shopping, could only be classed as supererogatory i.e. beyond the call of duty/necessity. Such an act in no way contributes to avoiding Hobbes’ SoN. Not that the SoN is a truth either. While Hobbes (1995, p.55) confirms the SoN never existed in all places at all times, he tries to back up this theory with real world examples of both primitive societies that live in such a way, and in the turmoil of states where the governments have recently collapsed (Rachels, 1999, p.145). In both cases I would suggest a flawed generalisation. At the time Hobbes was writing colonialism was mostly a brutal and parochial endeavour for imperialists to take land and the church to proselytise. Tolerance of foreign native’s resistance or customs was not at its most mature level of advancement. Similarly, while ‘mob rule’ in new anarchies is not denied as being an observed occurrence, there is still the implicit suggestion of co-operation for mobs to exist. Taking this example of human behaviour further, we might look to the current international system of anarchy (Rachels, 1999, p.145). While each country is indeed out for itself in the greater scheme of things (there is actually a reasoned and influential political theory attributed partly to Hobbes known as political ‘realism’ (Kegley, 2009, pp.27-32)), even in this arena strategic alliances are made between nations. The question to ask must be; is this affiliation in the name of self-interested security, or for more altruistic notions such as the prosperity and safety of all? Or to simplify; is psychological egoism true?

I think psychological egoism as a theory in itself is flawed. To begin, there are countless examples of people (and even animals (Hume, cited in Moseley, 2005, p.1)) whose actions do not appear motivated by self-interest. From Mahatma Ghandi to Che Guevara there is historical evidence of other-regarding behaviour taking priority over self-interest. In cases such as this, psychological egoists attempt to answer using a troublesome manoeuvre known as reinterpreting motives (Smith, 2009, p.9). In Guevara’s case they might argue that he swapped middle class life as a doctor for the danger of guerrilla warfare (leading to his death by assassination), only to palliate his own guilty conscience about socio-economic inequality i.e. he was motivated by his own desire to help peasants fight back because seeing them helpless made him feel bad. Deep down he was operating to promote his own interests and peace of mind. But this doesn’t work. Firstly, if Guevara didn’t already have other-regarding motives before acting to ease his conscience, then he never would have acted - social inequality wouldn’t have mattered to him in the first place. The other-regarding behaviour preceded the self-regarding behaviour (if indeed it was that), because he felt the feeling of guilt before the feeling of duty (Feinberg, 1995, p.65). Of course reinterpreting motives is a troublesome manoeuvre in general. As motivation is a private and internal drive, counterexamples can technically be rendered void, and neither psychological egoism nor other-regarding motivation can be proven or disproven. In the end the argument can be both justified by its proponent and rejected by its opponent behind a veil of subjective mystery (Moseley, 2005, p.1).

In describing my own experience I don’t think moral motivation is fixed in self-regarding or other-regarding behaviour, but rather floats in-between. The Golden Rule defines my moral behaviour as a principle of fairness, but often only after my own interests are met. Rawls, sharing this view, applies it in A Theory of Justice as the basis for his ‘Veil of Ignorance’ (a hypothetical position where we have no preconceived assumptions about our own needs/desires and can make decisions on justice without bias). The ‘Original Position’ adopted behind the ‘Veil of Ignorance’ is often likened to an abstract SoN, and used as a platform from which to build principles of what is right, similar to Hobbes’ SCT (Friend, 2004, p.3a). I think it’s fair to say that people can display other-regarding behaviour, but only inconsistently and when their own needs are met or swept away. As Singer (1979, p.319) observantly muses; morality leads to different conclusions for different people as they all start from different places.

In conclusion, while there are some good reasons for accepting the SCT as a viable description of morality, it ultimately rests upon a theory of psychological egoism which is logically flawed and may never be proven. Both my own subjective view of morality and Rawls’ theory of justice believe that other-regarding behaviour is possible given the right circumstances, but this fundamentally renders both Hobbes’ SoN and SCT untenable.

REFERENCES

• Feinberg, J 1995, "Psychological egoism" in Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, eds. LP Pojman, Wadsworth, Belmont, pp.62-73.
• Friend, C 2004, Social Contract Theory, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed February 05 2010, < http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont>.
• Hobbes, T 1995, ‘The Leviathan’, in Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, eds. LP Pojman, Wadsworth, Belmont, pp.53-61.
• Kegley, C 2009, ‘Theories of World Politics’, in World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Wadsworth, Belmont, p.27-32.
• Kymlicka, W 1991, 'The Social Contract Tradition' in A Companion to Ethics eds. P Singer, Blackwell, Oxford.
• Moseley, A 2005, Egoism, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed February 01 2010, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/egoism>.
• Plato 2006, ‘Crito’ in The Dialogues of Plato, Church FJ (trans.), Bantam, New York, pp.37-44.
• Plato 1993, ‘The Ring of Gyges’, in Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics, eds. C Sommers; F Sommers, Harcourt, Fort Worth, pp.445-450.
• Rachels, J 1999, "The idea of a social contract" in The Elements of Moral Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp.143-161.
• Singer, P 1979, 'Why Act Morally?', in Practical Ethics,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.319.
• Smith, N 2009, Lecture on Egoism (Week 8), PHI110 SP4, Macquarie University pp.1-22.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Baier, K 1991, 'Egoism', in A Companion to Ethics, eds. P Singer, Blackwell, Oxford.
• D’Agostino, F 2008, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed February 07 2010, < http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary>.
• Feinberg, J 1995, "Psychological egoism" in Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, eds. LP Pojman, Wadsworth, Belmont, pp.62-73.
• Friend, C 2004, Social Contract Theory, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed February 05 2010, < http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont>.
• Harsanyi, J 1982, 'Morality and the theory of rational behaviour', in Utilitarianism and Beyond, eds. A Sen; B Williams, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Hobbes, T 1995, ‘The Leviathan’, in Ethical Theory: Classical and Contemporary Readings, eds. LP Pojman, Wadsworth, Belmont, pp.53-61.
• Kegley, C 2009, ‘Theories of World Politics’, in World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Wadsworth, Belmont, p.25-50.
• Kymlicka, W 1991, 'The Social Contract Tradition' in A Companion to Ethics eds. P Singer, Blackwell, Oxford.
• Moseley, A 2005, Egoism, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed February 01 2010, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/egoism>.
• Plato 1993, ‘The Ring of Gyges’, in Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics, eds. C Sommers; F Sommers, Harcourt, Fort Worth, pp.445-450.
• Plato 2006, ‘Crito’ in The Dialogues of Plato, Church FJ (trans.), Bantam, New York.
• Rachels, J 1999, "The idea of a social contract" in The Elements of Moral Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, Boston, pp.143-161.
• Singer, P 1979, 'Why Act Morally?', in Practical Ethics,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• Smith, N 2009, Lecture on Egoism (Week 8), PHI110 SP4, Macquarie University.