The paradox of future individuals is also known as the non-identity problem, and offers a logical argument that seems to justify any action affecting future individuals, regardless or moral intention or outcome.
The paradox (Kavka, 1982, pp.93-94) is most clearly seen in the form of a standardisation:
1.1.1. Stable genetic structure is a pre-requisite for personal identity
1.1.2. Change the conditions leading to conception, and this will change the genetic structure for any offspring
1. 1. Changing genetic structure for offspring will also change their personal identity
1. A social policy which changes the conditions for conception over time will result in different persons being born, than if that policy had not been in place
2. A social policy which allows for unrestricted procreative action will result in overcrowding and set a particular set of conditions for conception in place
3. The overcrowding will be bad enough to degrade future individual’s lives, but not so bad they would be better off not existing
4. A moral wrong is an action whereby a person is or will be harmed
5. For a person to be harmed, an event must make them worse off than they would have had there been no event
6. If we implement a social policy that causes significant overcrowding in future, only individuals (group-A) who were conceived under the conditions of the policy will live in an overcrowded world (environment-A)
7. If we don’t implement a social policy that causes overcrowding in future (, only individuals (group-B) who were conceived without the conditions of the policy will get to live in an uncrowded world (environment-B)
C. There is nothing morally wrong with implementing a policy that causes significant overcrowding in future as it will harm no-one nor make them worse off
The point is, implementing this social policy will cause different procreative conditions to occur, and even though environment-A is worse than environment-B, group-A would only ever exist in environment-A. Plus, because their existence is still not so bad as to justify non-existence, they are better off for having been born into that world. They have not been harmed in any way, because if the world was not overcrowded, then they would not even exist.
Kavka approaches the issue by stating there are certain conditions of society which intrinsically and morally, desirable or undesirable. He points to the fact that the overcrowded world resulting from this social policy is intrinsically less desirable than a world with less crowding (Kavka, 1982, p.104). To demonstrate, he introduces the notion of a ‘restricted life’. This is a life that, in some fundamental way, is missing aspects of existence that normally make living worthwhile and valuable. A policy which leads to an overcrowded world is morally wrong, he says, because an overcrowded world will inevitably lead to many ‘restricted lives’ (Kavka, 1982, p.105). Part of the problem with Kavka’s argument however, is that he does not qualify what the aspects of life are that make it worthwhile and valuable, nor does he state particular reasons why overcrowding would necessarily restrict this. Whilst I concede that we can easily think up examples in either camp, these may vary depending on the subjective desires of different people. What is worthwhile and valuable to one person may be less so to another, and overcrowding may have little or no impact to this particular way of life.
Kavka’s argument is that we can solve the non-identity problem by allowing for the notion of a restricted life and attempting to avoid this scenario wherever possible. Whilst his conception is valid in its reasoning and application, it requires qualification to make it meaningful, and to allow a practical ethic to be applied.
BIBLIOGRAPHY/REFERENCES
§ Kavka, Gregory, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, 1982: 93-112.
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